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Chapter 1
Small Scale Research Project
The first two years of a new primary care mental health team: 
waiting times and the number of patients discharged 
following failure to attend their first appointments
Prepared in accordance with requirements for submission to Health Bulletin (see Appendix 1.1).
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Abstract
Objectives: This study focused upon the first two working years of a primary care mental 
health team. The main aims were: 1) to profile average waiting times over the two-year 
period, 2) to determine the proportion of patients discharged following failure to attend a 
single appointment, and 3) to analyse the relationship between waiting times and 
attendance for initial appointments. It was hoped that this information would provide a 
useful baseline for future evaluation of an opt-in system introduced in April 2004. 
Design: Relevant data were collected from the team referral log and patient files. Waiting 
time was defined as the number of days between receipt of referral and initial 
appointment. Patients were classified as attendees if they attended at least one session 
with the team.
Setting: A primary care mental health team in the west of Scotland which caters for 
adults experiencing mild to moderate mental health problems and which receives the 
majority of its referrals from eight GP practices in the local area.
Subjects: 374 routine referrals who had received offers of an initial appointment with a 
member of the team between 1st April 2002 and 31st March 2004.
Results: The mean waiting time for all routine referrals was 53 days. It was shown that 
waiting times significantly increased between April 2002 and March 2004. Of the cohort, 
276 (74%) were classified as attendees and 98 (26%) were non-attendees. A significant 
association was demonstrated between waiting time and whether patients attended. 
Specifically, those who had longer waiting times were less likely to attend.
Conclusions: The current findings were examined in the context of methodological 
limitations and service recommendations were discussed. In particular, it was stressed 
that this investigation should provide an important baseline for evaluating a recently 
introduced opt-in system in a few months time.
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Introduction
Waiting lists
The implementation of waiting lists is conventionally viewed as a necessary 
response to the ubiquitous problem of demand outstripping mental health service capacity 
[1]. Demand is influenced by a complex set of factors including population density, 
fluctuations in the prevalence of mental health problems, differences in the efficiency 
with which disorders are identified, and the degree of stigmatisation associated with 
seeking help. Treatment capacity is affected by numerous political and economic factors, 
as well as the rate of mental health service utilisation, treatment length, treatment format, 
treatment cost, and the efficiency with which treatment is delivered [2].
Within clinical psychology services, growth in waiting lists is a common problem. 
In 1993, a Division of Clinical Psychology (DCP) survey estimated that 44% of referred 
patients would wait at least six months for a first appointment. 15% would wait for more 
than one year, and at any one time, approximately 28,000 people were on psychologists’ 
waiting lists [3]. A more recent review suggested that, on average, patients were waiting 
17.5 weeks for a first appointment [4]. Obviously, these figures hide significant variation. 
The 1993 DCP survey found that only 15.5% of clinical psychologists believed that their 
service was meeting demand. In addition, some respondents reported that they had had to 
close their waiting lists and that some referrers had actually stopped referring on account 
of unsatisfactory waiting times.
Authors have acknowledged potential benefits in using waiting lists. For instance, 
some have argued that waiting lists may act as a deterrent for those who do not have an 
urgent or compelling need for treatment [5]. Also, some clients’ problems may remit 
whilst waiting for a first appointment. For example, May [6] showed that one third of 
individuals no longer expressed a need for treatment after waiting several months for an
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appointment at a university counselling service. Nevertheless, most of the literature has 
tended to focus on the difficulties associated with employment of waiting lists. In 
particular, mental health patients endure a variety of costs when access to treatment is 
delayed. These include the prolongation of emotional distress and occupational/social 
dysfunction, and increased risk of hospitalisation and physical health problems [7, 8]. 
Furthermore, by the time treatment commences, the original difficulties may have been 
exacerbated, thereby introducing additional obstacles to the therapeutic process [2, 9].
For example, Hicks and Hickman [10] proposed that if treatment is delayed, individuals 
are forced into resorting to maladaptive coping strategies, thus increasing the severity of 
their original problem. Finally, the process of seeking support and being placed on a 
waiting list may generate a poor image of mental health provision. For instance, it has 
been shown that client confidence in the service reduces as waiting times grow [11] and 
that waiting time is the most important factor in determining perceived service quality 
[12]. As well as the implications for users, researchers have investigated the 
consequences for mental health professionals in using waiting lists. For example, 
providers may assume a certain level of ethical responsibility for prolonged waiting times 
thus leading to reduced morale and diminished satisfaction [13]. As well as promoting 
staff turnover, these effects may filter through to patients, thereby interfering with the 
formation of therapeutic alliances and reducing consumer satisfaction [2].
Bearing in mind all these issues, the development of efficient waiting list 
initiatives is essential in mental health provision. Indeed, the Professional Practice 
Guidelines [14] state that services must be, “accessible to our clients”, and dictate that, 
“where a long waiting list develops for a service, psychologists should.... make every 
effort to improve response times”.
4
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Attendance
In services already struggling to meet demand, poor attendance is a major 
concern. Davies [15] found that 30% of patients failed to attend appointments in general 
hospital clinics and similar figures have been reported for psychological and psychiatric 
services [16, 17, 18, 19]. For example, Keen and colleagues [19] found that 33% of 
patients did not attend for their initial appointments at a clinical psychology service in the 
East of Scotland. A plethora of studies have attempted to identify factors associated with 
poor attendance. Some have demonstrated significant relationships between non- 
attendance and variables such as socio-economic status, age and gender [20, 21].
Investigators have commonly demonstrated an association between waiting times 
and attendance. For example, Morton [22] found that those who did not attend their first 
appointments waited significantly longer than those who did attend. In addition,
Loumidis and Shropshire [23] showed that waiting times of more than six months were 
associated with non-attendance, and that non-attendees waited six weeks longer than 
attendees. Also, it is important to acknowledge that non-attendance results in wasted 
clinical resources, which in itself may exacerbate waiting times [19, 24]. Therefore, the 
relationship between waiting times and non-attendance rates is likely to be bi-directional.
Service Context
People experiencing mild to moderate mental health problems have a range of 
needs crucial to recovery. These include practical supports, work on medication 
compliance and provision of psychosocial interventions. The satisfaction of this range of 
needs is especially crucial at a time of crisis and accordingly, an easily accessible and 
holistic service is required. The establishment of the Primary Care Mental Health Team 
investigated in this study was based upon this approach. It was conceived as a multi­
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disciplinary, cross-agency service which would aim to provide a rapid response to 
patients requiring assistance during an acute period. The apparent feasibility in offering a 
rapid response was based upon the assumptions that the team would be offering a new 
resource in addition to other extant psychology and mental health services, that team 
members would manage their clinical time by only employing brief interventions 
(maximum of 12 sessions), and that the referral rate would be moderated both by using 
specific acceptance criteria (see below) and by working closely with referral agents. The 
team commenced its work in April 2002, was the first of its kind in Glasgow, and 
receives the vast majority of its referrals from eight GP practices in the local area. The 
team comprises a consultant clinical psychologist (1.0 WTE (whole time equivalent)), a 
community psychiatric nurse (1.0 WTE), two counsellors (both 0.5 WTE) and an 
administrator (0.7 WTE). Referrals are accepted for clients who are aged 16 or over, who 
do not present with major alcohol, drug or severe mental health problems, and who 
appear likely to benefit from brief (a maximum of 12 sessions) psychological 
intervention.
As already described, the key focus of the team is to offer a service with no or 
negligible waiting times. In fact, at its inception, the team aimed to adhere to a maximum 
response time of two weeks. However, over the first two years of its existence, it was 
apparent that waiting times were increasing well beyond this limit. Furthermore, there 
was a growing concern that more patients were failing to attend their first appointments. 
This led to the introduction of an opt-in system in April 2004, an approach aimed at 
reducing the amount of clinical time wasted through non-attendance of first 
appointments. Yet, it is important to acknowledge that evidence demonstrating the utility 
of opt-in systems in equivocal [25]. Accordingly, once the current opt-in system has been 
in place for a sufficient length of time, the team intends to examine whether there have
6
Chapter 1 Small Scale Research Project
been any beneficial effects upon waiting times and non-attendance rates. Obviously, in 
order to perform such an evaluation, it is essential to have exact figures for these 
variables prior to the introduction of the system. It was the primary aim of the current 
study to provide this baseline information.
Aims o f the current investigation:
The aims of the current investigation were as follows:
1) Profile average waiting times from 1st April 2002 through to 31st March 2004.
2) Establish the number of patients discharged following failure to attend a single 
appointment from 1st April 2002 through to 31st March 2004.
3) Examine the relationship between waiting times and the number of patients 
discharged following failure to attend a single appointment.
Methods
Setting
Certain details of the setting have already been discussed in the Introduction. 
Given the context of this investigation, it is highlighted that all initial assessments are 
carried out by either the clinical psychologist (1.0 WTE) or the community psychiatric 
nurse (1.0 WTE). Also, it is stressed that team membership did fluctuate over the course 
of the two-year period under investigation. At the beginning of April 2002, only the 
consultant clinical psychologist (1.0 WTE) had commenced work. Then, the community 
psychiatric nurse (1.0 WTE) and the two counsellors (both 0.5 WTE) joined the team and 
began seeing patients at the start of May 2002. Team membership remained stable until a 
counsellor left in December 2003. This vacancy was not filled until after April 2004.
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Subjects
This investigation focused on those patients categorised as routine referrals who 
were offered an initial appointment with a member of the team between 1st April 2002 
and 31st March 2004. This generated a cohort of 374 patients.
The study excluded priority (N=60) or urgent (N=35) referrals offered initial 
appointments in the same two-year period. This exclusion criterion was implemented on 
account of the fact that the opt-in system introduced in April 2004 is only used for routine 
patients. Therefore, when examining the opt-in system in future, it will only be pertinent 
to examine the effects for routine referrals.
It is also stressed that some referrals were never even offered initial appointments. 
This cohort largely comprised inappropriate referrals and those clients who cancelled 
their referral before an appointment letter was sent. It represented approximately 10% of 
referrals between 1st April 2002 and 31st March 2004 and obviously could not be included 
in this study of waiting times.
Procedure
For each patient, the following information was obtained from either the team 
referral log or individual patient notes:
i) date on which their referral was received by the team,
ii) date for which they were offered their initial appointment with the team. (It is 
highlighted that this date often did not coincide with the actual date that the 
patient first attended. For instance, a number of patients requested that their initial 
appointment be rearranged for their convenience. Nevertheless, the current study 
focuses upon the date of the initial appointment first offered).
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iii) whether or not they ever actually attended an appointment with a member of the 
team.
These data were entered into a central database which contained no patient 
identifiers. Each patient was assigned to one of eight successive three-month blocks 
running from 1st April 2002 to 31st March 2004 (i.e. April-June 2002, July-September
2002, October-December 2002, January-March 2003, April-June 2003, July-September
2003, October-December 2003 and January-March 2004). Assignment to a particular 
three-month block was determined by the date of the initial appointment first offered, not 
the date that the referral was received.
For each patient, waiting time was calculated as the number of days between i) 
and ii) (see above). Then, for patients in each three-month block, the mean waiting time 
was calculated. In addition, standard error of the mean (SEM) and range were taken as 
indices of variability.
For attendance, patients were assigned to one of two groups:
1) Attendees - those who attended at least one appointment with the team. 
Accordingly, this group included a wide range of clients, from those who simply 
attended a single assessment session through to those who engaged in a course of 
treatment.
2) Non-attendees - those who did not attend a single appointment. This group 
included those patients who failed to attend and never made any form of contact 
with the service, those who cancelled their referral once they had received an 
appointment letter, and those who made repeated requests to reschedule their 
initial appointment, but ultimately never attended.
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These definitions of attendance and non-attendance have been employed in other 
studies of clinical psychology services [e.g. 19]. Furthermore, they seemed most 
appropriate on account of the fact that the newly introduced opt-in system focuses on 
attendance for the first appointment.
Statistical analysis
All exploratory data analyses and statistical procedures were conducted using the 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences [SPSS; 26]. Howell [27] was employed as the 
main statistics resource text. All significance tests were two-tailed. A significance 
threshold of p=0.05 was implemented for all effects examined. Although data presented 
are untransformed means, suitable transformations were carried out where necessary to 
stabilise variance or reduce skew in the distributions.
Data meeting the assumptions of parametric analysis were analysed using t-tests 
or analysis of variance (ANOVA). Where two groups were compared on a single 
measure, unpaired t-tests were conducted. For these calculations, the pooled variance 
estimate was always employed, as advised by Howell [27]. When examining more than 
two groups for a single variable, one-way ANOVAs were performed. Categorical data 
were analysed using Pearson’s Chi-square (x ) test.
Results
Waiting times
For the 374 routine referrals taken together, the mean (SEM) waiting time was 53 
days (1.3 days). Mean waiting times for the eight three-month blocks running from 1st 
April 2002 to 31st March 2004 are presented in Table 1. They are also depicted in Figure
1.
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Waiting times were analysed using one-way ANOVA with three-month block as 
the between-subjects factor. As expected, this analysis revealed a significant main effect 
of three-month block [F(7,366) = 172, p < 0.001], There would be limited utility in 
performing numerous post-hoc comparisons between the eight three-month blocks. 
Instead, a single planned comparison was made between waiting times for the April-June 
2002 and January-March 2004 blocks. It was confirmed that waiting times for the latter 
block were significantly longer than those for the former block [t(l 14) = 39, p < 0.001].
[Table 1 and Figure 1 about here]
Attendance
Of the original cohort of 374 routine referrals, 276 (74%) were classified as 
attendees and 98 (26%) were non-attendees. Of the 98 non-attendees, 60 never contacted 
the team, 20 cancelled their appointments and requested no further assistance, and 18 
made contact in order to reschedule their initial appointment, but ultimately never 
attended. The number of attendees and non-attendees for the eight three-month blocks 
running from 1st April 2002 to 31st March 2004 are shown in Table 2 and Figure 2.
[Table 2 and Figure 2 about here]
Relationship between waiting times and attendance
The patient cohort was split into three relatively even groups according to their 
waiting times. The details of these groups are as follows:
1) Short waiting time group. N = 127; range of waiting times = 6-43 days.
2) Medium waiting time group. N = 120; range of waiting times = 44-68 days.
11
Chapter 1 Small Scale Research Project
3) Long waiting time group. N = 127; range of waiting times = 69-109 days.
The numbers of patients categorised as attendees or non-attendees in each of the 
short and long groups were placed into a 2x2 contingency table (see Table 3). Analysis 
revealed that there was a significant association between waiting time and whether 
patients ever attended = 5.1, p < 0.05].
[Table 3 about here]
This finding was confirmed by carrying out a simple comparison of the waiting 
times for all 276 attendees [mean (sem; range) = 52 days (1.5 days; 6-109 days)] and all 
98 non-attendees [mean (sem; range) = 59 days (2.5 days; 10-101 days)]. Non-attendees 
waited significantly longer than attendees [t(372) = 2.5, p < 0.05]. Similarly, it was found 
that median (interquartile range) waiting times for attendees and non-attendees were 55 
days (32-70) and 65 days (41.5-73.5), respectively.
Discussion
The current investigation examined the first two working years of a new primary 
care mental health team with a view to satisfying three main objectives. The findings 
relating to these objectives will be discussed in turn, followed by a discussion of 
methodological limitations and service recommendations.
Objective 1
The average waiting time for all 374 routine referrals was 53 days, equating to 
approximately VA weeks. In addition, it was shown that waiting times varied widely, with
12
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the lowest being 6 days and the highest being 109 days (approximately 16 weeks). As 
expected, it was demonstrated that waiting times significantly increased between April 
2002 and March 2004. However, although the general trend was for waiting times to 
increase over successive three-month blocks, inspection of the data indicates that waiting 
times fluctuated in both directions (see Figure 1). Nevertheless, the final three-month 
block between January and March 2004 was associated with the longest waiting times, 
and is reflective of the upward trend. Given that the service originally aimed for a 
maximum response time of two weeks, these findings are obviously disappointing. As 
extensively discussed in the Introduction, longer waiting times may be associated with a 
number of detrimental implications for both clients and service providers.
There are many factors that may have contributed to the increase in waiting times. 
This discussion will raise three possible factors. First, some patients have been seen for 
more than 12 sessions. Members of the team have commented that they have found it 
very difficult to discharge some patients simply because they have reached an arbitrary 
limit of 12 appointments. Second, relative to some other extant psychology and mental 
health services in the local area, the team maintains a short waiting time. Accordingly, it 
seems that referral agents have been more inclined to refer patients to the team, thereby 
exacerbating the problem of demand outstripping capacity (the clinical psychologist (1.0 
WTE) and the community psychiatric nurse (1.0 WTE) were each able to offer 
approximately 80 initial assessments per annum). Third, it is likely that there was an 
indirect impact of the counselling vacancy in the final three-month block (January-March 
2004). Indeed, there was a considerable rise in waiting times during this period.
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Objective 2
Overall, it was found that 26% of routine referrals did not attend a single 
appointment with the team. This figure is consistent with other studies of clinical 
psychology services that have defined attendance using similar criteria [e.g. 19, 28]. Of 
the 98 non-attendees, the majority (N=60) did not contact the team in order to state that 
they would not be attending. Consequently, valuable clinical time was wasted (although 
see below). Indeed, this finding provides clear support for the potential utility in 
employing an opt-in system. Elaborating, it would be hoped that a sensitively worded 
opt-in letter and provision for an easy response (i.e. a stamped addressed envelope and 
reply slip) would encourage patients to contact the service to decline further assistance. 
Then, this would enable the team to offer their appointments to other patients. 20 non­
attendees did, in fact, contact the team in order to decline the service once they received 
their initial appointment letters. Whilst objective data were not available for this study, it 
is noteworthy that the team feels that many of these cancellations have occurred at too 
short notice to allow appointments to be assigned to other clients on the waiting list. Once 
again, this suggests that employment of an opt-in system might be beneficial. In 
discussing non-attendance rates, two caveats should be raised. First, many mental health 
workers admit that when patients fail to attend appointments, they often use the spare 
time to write letters and carry out other administrative tasks. Indeed, this sentiment is 
endorsed by members of the team in this investigation. Therefore, this begs the question 
of whether clinical time is actually wasted by non-attendance. In fact, it would be 
interesting to conduct a survey into how clinical psychologists and other professionals 
use the time freed when a patient does not attend an appointment. Second, there will 
always be a degree of non-attendance which cannot be eliminated by the efforts of an 
individual service. For example, some patients may leave the area before they are offered
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an appointment or some may feel too stigmatised or frightened by the prospect of 
receiving assistance for mental health difficulties.
Objective 3
As expected, this investigation revealed a significant association between waiting 
times and attendance. Specifically, attendees had shorter waiting times than non­
attendees. This relationship has been demonstrated in a number of other studies of mental 
health services [e.g. 29]. Its manifestation can be interpreted in a variety of ways. For 
instance, it could be hypothesised that some referrals who are required to wait for a long 
time before their first appointments are able to overcome their difficulties using other 
resources (e.g. social support). A more bleak interpretation is that the experience of 
seeking support and being placed on a lengthy waiting list may generate disenchantment 
with the service [e.g. 11, 12]. Subsequently, although these patients would still benefit 
from psychological input, they feel disinclined to attend.
In absolute terms, it must be stressed that the difference between average waiting 
times for attendees and non-attendees was only seven days. Furthermore, a number of 
non-attendees (N=26 (from 98 in total)) were categorised as having short waiting times 
(range = 6-43 days) and many attendees (N=85 (from 276 in total)) had long waiting 
times (range = 69-109 days). Therefore, waiting time alone may have limited value in 
predicting whether patients will attend. In future, this hypothesis could be examined 
explicitly by carrying out a conditional stepwise logistic regression analysis using an 
array of variables postulated to influence attendance (e.g. gender, socio-economic status, 
waiting time, referral agent).
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Methodological limitations
The findings of this study must be considered within the context of some of its 
methodological limitations. First, there was some variation in the delay between the 
patient meeting their referring agent (usually their GP) and the date on which the team 
received the referral. Therefore, waiting times, as defined in this investigation, may not 
wholly reflect waiting times as experienced by some of the patients. Nevertheless, the 
team did receive the vast majority of referrals within a few days. Second, as already 
discussed, a variety of factors may be influential in determining waiting times and 
attendance. Yet, this study simply focused upon the relationship between these two 
factors. Third, this investigation has solely examined attendance in relation to initial 
appointments. It is acknowledged that patients often fail to attend for return 
appointments.
Service Recommendations
Three recommendations are presented below:
1) As outlined in the Methods, attendees were defined as those patients who attended 
at least one appointment with the team. However, at present, there is no exact 
record of when attendees attend for the first time. Therefore, the attendee group 
includes: i) those who attended the initial appointment first offered, ii) those who 
contacted the team to reschedule their initial appointment and who therefore 
attended at a later date, and iii) those who failed to attend their initial 
appointment, but who subsequently made contact to arrange another appointment. 
Therefore, clinical time is, in fact, wasted with some attendees. Therefore, it is 
recommended that the existing referral log be amended to enable the identification
16
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of the attendee sub-groups described above. This would allow the team to 
establish the amount of clinical time lost and whether any action is required.
2) At present, no record is kept of the number of return appointments not attended. 
Given the problem of increasing waiting times, it could be helpful to monitor the 
clinical time lost in this context.
3) It would be informative to carry out an evaluation of the opt-in system once it has 
been functioning for six months. In particular, it would be important to establish 
whether its employment has had any demonstrable benefits upon waiting times 
and the number of non-attendees. If it was found that the opt-in system was not 
creating the desired effects, it may be necessary to introduce other strategies. For 
example, the team may consider employing more group-based treatment 
approaches.
Summary
In conclusion, it has been demonstrated that waiting times for routine referrals 
significantly increased between April 2002 and March 2004. 26% of clients failed to 
attend a single appointment with the team. The majority of these non-attendees did not 
contact the service and accordingly, their initial appointments were wasted. Those who 
had longer waiting times were significantly less likely to attend. Methodological 
limitations and service recommendations are discussed.
17
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Table 1. Mean waiting times (days) for routine referrals for each of the three-month 
blocks running from 1st April 2002 to 31st March 2004. SEM and range are taken as 
indices of variability. __________ _______________ _______________ _________
Three-month block N Mean waiting 
time (days)
SEM (days) Range (days)
Apr-June ‘02 71 19 1.1 6-43
July-Sep ‘02 41 33 2.2 9-84
Oct-Dec ‘02 42 67 1.6 32-91
Jan-Mar ‘03 39 69 1.4 50-90
Apr-June ‘03 54 59 1.7 36-88
July-Sep ‘03 42 52 2.1 21-76
Oct-Dec ‘03 40 63 2.6 6-87
Jan-Mar ‘04 45 87 1.3 65-109
Overall 374 53 1.3 6-109
Abbreviations: N=number o f patients offered initial appointments; SEM=standard error o f the mean.
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Table 2. Numbers of routine referrals categorised as attendees and non-attendees for each 
of the three-month blocks running from 1st April 2002 to 31st March 2004._____________
..................................... Number of attendees Number of non-attendees
Apr-June ‘02 52 19
July-Sep ‘02 33 8
Oct-Dec ‘02 28 14
Jan-Mar ‘03 30 9
Apr-June ‘03 41 13
July-Sep ‘03 34 8
Oct-Dec ‘03 27 13
Jan-Mar ‘04 31 14
Overall 276 98
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Table 3. Numbers of routine referrals categorised as attendees or non-attendees as a 
function of whether they had short (6-43 days) or long (69-109 days) waiting times.
_________________________________ Attendees_______________Non-attendees
Short waiting time group 101 26
Long waiting time____________________ 85_______________________ 42______
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Figure 1. Mean waiting times (days) for routine referrals. These are shown for successive 
three-month blocks running from 1st April 2002 to 31st March 2004. Bars represent 1 
SEM.
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Figure 2. Numbers of routine referrals categorised as attendees or non-attendees. These 
are shown for successive three-month blocks running from 1st April 2002 to 31st March 
2004.
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Systematic Review
The effects of suppressing obsessive intrusive thoughts: 
a systematic review of the experimental literature
Prepared in accordance with requirements for submission to Clinical Psychology Review (see Appendix 
2.1).
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Abstract
Thought suppression has been commonly cited as a developmental and/or 
maintaining factor in cognitive-behavioural conceptualisations of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD). The current review synthesised findings from experimental 
investigations that have examined the suppression of thoughts characteristic of OCD. 
Computerised database searches and other strategies were used to identify relevant 
papers. In total, 11 studies satisfied criteria for inclusion. Employing a structured rating 
scale, two studies were found to be of high methodological quality, eight of moderate 
quality, and one of low quality. With respect to thought occurrences, no study provided 
evidence for the purported rebound effect of suppression. Only two investigations 
generated data consistent with immediate enhancement. Moreover, almost all effect sizes 
went in the opposite direction to expectation. For measures beyond thought occurrence, 
findings were mixed. Whilst there appears to be limited support for the citation of thought 
suppression in conceptualisations of obsessional problems, the review highlights an 
extant literature lacking in many respects. Studies over longer time periods and within 
participants’ everyday environment are therefore recommended, as are studies using 
clinical samples.
Keywords: obsessive-compulsive disorder, thought suppression, systematic
review
Introduction
Fallibility in thought suppression
An investigation by Wegner and colleagues (Wegner et al., 1987) has had a 
remarkable impact upon subsequent conceptualisations of psychological problems. Their 
study comprised two 5-minute experimental periods during which participants vocalised
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their stream of consciousness into a tape recorder. For the first period, participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions, suppression and expression. In the 
suppression condition, participants verbalised their thoughts whilst trying not to think 
about a white bear. In the expression condition, participants tried to think of a white bear. 
In the second experimental period, instructions were swapped between groups. During 
both experimental periods, participants rang a bell whenever thoughts about a white bear 
came to mind.
Two important findings emerged from this work. First, participants were not able 
to suppress completely thoughts about white bears. Second, comparison of performance 
under expression instructions revealed that participants who had already suppressed in the 
first period recorded significantly more thoughts about a white bear relative to those who 
expressed in the first period. This phenomenon was termed a ‘rebound effect’ since 
suppression led to a subsequent surge in thoughts. These observations suggested that 
attempted thought suppression can have paradoxical effects as a self-control strategy 
(Wegner et al., 1987). Wegner et al. also postulated that this form of mental control could 
play a role in generating and maintaining obsessions and preoccupations.
Further studies o f thought suppression
The Wegner study generated a great deal of experimental research interest in 
thought suppression. Several authors since, have assessed the effects of suppressing 
neutral thoughts. Some noted rebound effects (e.g. Clark et al., 1991; Clark et al., 1993), 
others did not (e.g. Merckelbach et al., 1991; Muris et al., 1993). In addition, some 
investigators found that suppression led to an ‘immediate enhancement effect’ whereby, 
whilst suppressing, participants experience more target thoughts than those in a control
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condition (e.g. Lavy & van den Hout, 1990). Other studies did not demonstrate this effect 
(e.g. Clark et al., 1991).
Given the potential relevance for understanding psychological disorders 
characterised by recurrent unwanted thoughts, researchers have also looked at the 
suppression of disorder-specific thoughts such as worry-related thoughts (Mathews & 
Milroy, 1994; Becker et al., 1998), anxious thoughts (e.g. Roemer & Borkovec, 1994; 
Koster et al., 2003), trauma-related thoughts (e.g. Harvey & Bryant, 1998; Shipherd & 
Beck, 2005), and obsessional thoughts (e.g. McNally & Ricciardi, 1996; Purdon et al., 
2005). Most of these studies have been conducted in non-clinical populations, again with 
rather inconsistent results (Purdon, 1999).
However, a recent meta-analysis of studies examining neutral and clinically 
relevant thoughts (Abramowitz et al., 2001) did confirm a small-to-medium rebound 
effect of suppression, although there was no evidence for an immediate enhancement 
effect. These data may, to some extent, justify inclusion of thought suppression in recent 
cognitive conceptualisations of psychological disorders, including obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD; Salkovskis, 1989), posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Ehlers & Clark, 
2000), and generalised anxiety disorder (GAD; Wells, 1995).
The purported role o f  thought suppression in obsessive-compulsive disorder
Theoretically at least, the potential relevance of thought suppression to OCD, a 
disorder characterised by persistent, unwanted thoughts, images and impulses, is obvious. 
Indeed, a number of cognitive-behavioural accounts of OCD cite thought suppression as 
key to disorder development and maintenance (Salkovskis, 1989, 1998; Clark & Purdon, 
1993; Rachman, 1997, 1998; Clark, 2004). All these conceptualisations are based upon 
the view that clinical obsessions originate from the same type of unwanted, ego-dystonic
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intrusions documented as frequent and naturally occurring in the general population 
(Clark & O’Connor, 2005). Several studies have shown that unwanted intrusive thoughts, 
with content similar to clinical obsessions, are experienced by 80-99% of the population 
(e.g. Rachman & de Silva, 1978; Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984; Purdon & Clark, 1993). 
Cognitive-behavioural formulations posit that appraisal of these intrusions, and 
accompanying coping strategies (including suppression), are instrumental in the 
emergence and maintenance of clinical obsessions.
Salkovskis (1985, 1989) for instance, hypothesises that obsessional patients 
interpret intrusions as an indication of responsibility for harm to themselves or others 
unless preventative action is taken. This interpretation then increases: (1) discomfort, 
anxiety, and depression; (2) accessibility of the original thought and other related ideas; 
and (3) behavioural “neutralising” responses that constitute attempts to escape or avoid 
responsibility. Each of these effects contributes not only to the maintenance of anxiety, 
but also to a worsening spiral of intrusive thoughts leading to maladaptive affective, 
cognitive, and behavioural problems (Salkovskis, 1998). The realm of behavioural 
“neutralising” responses may include compulsive behaviour, avoidance of situations 
related to the obsessional thought, reassurance seeking (thus diluting or sharing 
responsibility), and, most pertinent for this review, attempts to get rid of, or exclude, the 
thought from mind.
Rachman (1998) similarly proposes that an inflated sense of significance attached 
to unwanted intrusions leads to vigorous and intense suppression attempts. Rachman 
points to previous findings demonstrating the deficiencies in thought suppression 
(Wegner et al., 1987) and concludes that such attempts may produce an increase in the 
frequency of the obsession. Moreover, this increase in frequency may strengthen beliefs 
about the significance of the obsession. Therefore, a vicious cycle is established.
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Clark and Purdon (Clark & Purdon, 1993; Purdon & Clark, 1999; Clark, 2004; 
Purdon, 2004) offer further insights. They suggest that it is important to consider pre­
existing beliefs about thoughts and thought processes in general. For example, individuals 
who believe that mental control is an important part of self-control will have a high stake 
in being able to control thoughts. Accordingly, if and when thought suppression fails, it is 
likely to be more distressing and more detrimental to mood. This may result in further 
increases in intrusion frequency.
In a recent review, Purdon (2004) provided a helpful summary of the potential 
insidious effects of thought suppression in OCD. First, it leads to an increase in thought 
frequency. Second, individuals become hypervigilant to thoughts and thought processes, 
thereby making obsession triggers and traces more salient. Third, it terminates exposure 
to the thought, thus precluding new learning about its importance. Fourth, inevitable 
thought recurrences enhance negative appraisals regarding the meaning of the thought. 
Overall, increased frequency and enhanced negative appraisals induce further decline in 
mood, making negative thoughts and appraisals more accessible. In turn, the motivation 
to control thoughts is more enhanced.
Rationale for the current review
It has been accepted for some time that obsessions give rise to resistance (e.g. 
Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). In fact, active resistance is a defining feature of obsessions 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and an important criterion for distinguishing 
obsessions from worry and depressive rumination (Turner et al., 1992; Wells & Morrison, 
1994). One form of active resistance is thought suppression, a mechanism which, as 
outlined above, features in cognitive-behavioural models of OCD. Given it is nearly 
twenty years since the first experimental investigation of thought suppression (Wegner et
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al., 1987), it would seem timely to carry out a systematic review of experimental studies 
which have examined its effects in relation to OCD-relevant thoughts.
It is acknowledged that informative reviews of the thought suppression literature 
have already been published (Purdon, 1999, 2004; Purdon & Clark, 2000; Rassin et al., 
2000; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000; Smari, 2001; Abramowitz et al., 2001), with some 
particularly focussed on the implications of thought suppression for OCD (Purdon & 
Clark, 2000; Smari, 2001; Purdon, 2004). However, to date, no review has been 
conducted in a systematic manner. Thus, there has not been transparency regarding why 
certain studies have been included. Moreover, no review has employed a methodical 
approach to assess study quality. Here, these limitations are remedied by applying strict 
inclusion criteria for study selection, and by assessing study quality using a standardised 
approach.
Findings are synthesised into two main categories. First, the impact of suppression 
upon thought occurrence is examined. Second, the effect of suppression on other 
pertinent domains is considered (thought appraisals, mood state). It is hoped the review 
will lead to the extraction of some important insights and provide further justification for 
the citation of this mechanism in formulations of OCD.
Method
Computerised search
In May 2006, the following computerised databases were searched: All EBM 
Reviews (Cochrane DSR, ACP Journal Club, DARE, and CCTR), EMBASE, CINAHL, 
MEDLINE (R), and PsycINFO. These keywords were employed: [THOUGHTS adj5 
SUPPRESSS] or [REBOUND EFFECT] or [THOUGHT CONTROL] or [MENTAL 
CONTROL] or [THOUGHT REBOUND] or [IRONIC PROCESSS] or [WHITE
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BEARS]. The search was limited to studies reported in English and published in 1987 or 
thereafter. The latter criterion was based upon the year in which Wegner and colleagues 
published their original investigation into thought suppression (Wegner et al., 1987). In 
addition, duplicates were removed from the retrieved articles.
On two occasions, the title and abstract of retrieved papers were studied to 
ascertain relevance to the present review. Then, for those considered relevant, the full 
article was obtained and read in order to determine whether it satisfied inclusion criteria 
(see below). The final decision regarding inclusion was made by the author and another 
researcher experienced in conducting systematic reviews (Dr Niall Broomfield, 
University of Glasgow).
Other search strategies
In order to detect relevant studies not found via the computerised search, the 
following additional steps were taken:
1) The reference sections of papers retrieved through the computerised search and 
subsequently selected for the review were examined.
2) The reference sections of pertinent non-systematic reviews identified in the 
computerised search were inspected.
3) An expert in the field (Dr Christine Purdon, University of Waterloo, Canada) was 
contacted.
4) The following key journals were hand searched from 1987 to May 2006, 
inclusive: Behaviour Research and Therapy, Cognitive Therapy and Research, 
Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, Journal of Anxiety Disorders, and 
Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry.
33
Chapter 2 Systematic Review
Inclusion and exclusion criteria
Inclusion criteria:
1) Studies in which a main aim focused on determining the effects of thought 
suppression.
2) Experimental studies which, at the very least, recruited one group of participants, 
employed a single measure of thought frequency, and used a thought suppression 
manipulation.
3) In those studies which recruited OCD patients, the target thoughts used in the 
experiment were related to obsessional problems. For studies using analogue 
samples, a procedure was adopted such that the target thoughts were relevant to 
OCD. In this regard, the process (e.g. uncontrollable, intrusive) and content (e.g. 
ego-dystonic: contrary to or inconsistent with one’s sense of self as reflected in 
core personal values, ideals, and moral attributes) of the target thoughts had been 
considered (for a discussion of this issue, see Clark & Purdon, 1995).
In order to establish whether criterion 3 was satisfied by some of the studies being 
considered, corresponding authors were contacted [Paul Salkovskis (Institute of 
Psychiatry, UK), Peter Muris (Maastricht University, The Netherlands), and Jacob Smari 
(University of Iceland)].
Exclusion criterion:
1) Unpublished dissertations.
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Ratings o f methodological quality
A structured rating scale was developed to assess the quality of included studies 
(see Appendix 2.2). Scale items were based on guidelines pertaining to quality 
assessment issued by the Centre of Reviews and Dissemination (CRD; Khan et al., 2001), 
and a published checklist (Downs & Black, 1998). The latter was specifically designed to 
assess studies employing differing designs. Items in the current checklist were also 
informed by methodological issues raised in reviews of empirical studies examining 
thought suppression (Purdon, 2000; Abramowitz et al., 2001). In addition, the author 
incorporated items that seemed particularly pertinent.
Items were scored as ‘ 1’ if criteria were met and as ‘0’ if they were not met, or if 
the necessary information was not provided. Some items were considered particularly 
important, in which case a score of ‘2’ was given if criteria were satisfied. When a 
particular question was not applicable to a study, it was marked as ‘X’. Once the checklist 
was completed for a study, a percentage score was calculated based upon the maximum 
possible total. Ratings above 70% were taken as indicative of high quality, those in the 
range of 40% to 70% were judged to be of moderate quality, and scores below 40% were 
classified as low in quality. These ratings provided the author with a general indicator for 
the confidence with which particular findings could be taken. They also enabled 
comparison between studies in a standardised way, thus minimising subjective opinion.
The author and another psychology researcher rated all the papers independently. 
Initial agreement was high (91%), and through discussion, complete agreement was 
reached on all checklist items for each study.
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Calculating effect sizes
Where possible, ‘immediate enhancement’ and ‘rebound’ effect sizes (ESs) were 
calculated for suppression groups. Immediate enhancement ESs were calculated 
according to the difference between thought occurrences under suppression instructions 
compared with baseline. Rebound ESs were computed based on the difference between 
thought occurrences in the post-suppression block compared with baseline. ESs were 
derived by calculating the difference between means and dividing by the pooled standard 
deviation (S D pooied)- This is a valid approach when the correlation between scores at two 
levels of a within-subjects variable is not known (Dunlap et al., 1996). In line with Cohen 
(1977, 1988), ES magnitudes of 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 corresponded to small, medium, and 
large effects, respectively.
Results
Retrieval o f studies
The computerised search yielded 2142 articles. Of these, 2110 were excluded on 
the basis of title and abstract alone. From the remaining 32 articles, 7 were non- 
systematic reviews or meta-analyses of relevance to the current review (Purdon, 1999; 
Purdon & Clark, 2000; Rassin et al., 2000; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000; Smari, 2001; 
Abramowitz et al., 2001; Purdon, 2004). From the other 25 papers, 14 were excluded 
after reading the full text. Reasons for their exclusion are documented in Table 1.
Thus, from the computerised search, 11 experimental studies remained and were 
included in the review. The other search strategies yielded no further studies.
[Table 1 about here]
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Methodological quality ratings
Table 2 shows the scoring for each paper. Overall study quality ranged from 33% 
to 75%, with a mean of 56%. Two studies were of high quality, eight of moderate quality, 
and one of low quality.
[Table 2 about here]
General observations about the eleven studies included in the review
Table 3 provides a descriptive summary of each of the eleven studies included in 
the review. A few observations about these studies are now made.
[Table 3 about here]
Cohorts recruited
Total study sample sizes ranged from 40 to 219. In four investigations, not all 
participants monitored obsessional thoughts; some were required to track positive or 
neutral target thoughts instead. Across studies, the mean number of participants 
monitoring obsessive intrusive thoughts was 58. For these individuals, the mean number 
within particular experimental groups was 22 (range: 10-44; the lower value for this 
range is a best estimate; McNally & Ricciardi (1996) quoted an overall sample size of 42, 
but did not report how many were placed in each of their 4 experimental groups).
Only two studies recruited OCD patients (Janeck & Calamari, 1999; Purdon et al., 
2005). For both studies, patients were attending out-patient clinics and diagnoses were 
confirmed using structured clinical interviews. As would be expected, there was 
significant comorbidity in both cohorts and many were taking psychoactive medication. It
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was not reported whether patients had any history of receiving psychological 
interventions for their difficulties. In one of these two clinical studies (Janeck and 
Calamari, 1999), a non-clinical control group was also recruited. This group was screened 
for anxiety disorders using a structured clinical interview, but no self-report measure of 
current obsessive-compulsive symptomatology was administered. An adapted version of 
the Intrusive Thoughts Questionnaire (ITQ; Edwards & Dickerson, 1987; see below for a 
description of this measure) was employed to ensure that all participants had experienced 
at least one negative intrusion in the previous two weeks. Many of the group were 
students or university employees.
Of the remaining nine studies, eight exclusively recruited university students. The 
other investigation used hospital staff. Four of these non-clinical studies (Trinder & 
Salkovskis, 1994; Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994; Belloch et al., 2004; Hardy & Brewin, 
2005) employed basic screening procedures to select participants who had experienced 
obsessional-type intrusions.
Four of the non-clinical studies utilised the Maudsley Obsessive-Compulsive 
Inventory (MOCI; Hodgson & Rachman, 1977), a 30-item self-report questionnaire, to 
assess the degree of obsessive-compulsive symptomatology in their samples (Trinder & 
Salkovskis, 1994; Belloch et al., 2004; Hardy & Brewin, 2005; Marcks & Woods, 2005). 
All found that mean severity was within the normal range (means ranged from 3.3 to 9.4). 
One study (Hardy & Brewin, 2005) differentiated two groups (‘high’ and ‘low’ 
obsessionality) on the basis of scores on the MOCI, although the authors did not quote 
the mean group scores separately (overall mean = 7.7). Purdon and Clark (2001) used the 
Revised Obsessive Intrusions Inventory (ROII; Purdon & Clark, 1993, 1994; see below 
for description), a self-report measure which assesses the frequency of obsessional 
intrusions. They did not report any values, but stated that their cohort fell within the
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expected range for ‘a university sample’. Finally, three non-clinical studies documented 
little or no information regarding the degree of obsessional symptomatology in their 
samples (McNally & Ricciardi, 1996; Purdon, 2001; Rassin, 2001).
Experimental settings and time course
Only one study (Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994) was conducted in participants’ 
everyday environment. This investigation took place over the course of four days. The 
remaining ten studies were laboratory-based and employed experimental blocks which 
lasted 3 to 6 minutes.
Identification o f obsessive intrusive thought
A variety of approaches were employed to identify a target thought. Four studies 
(Purdon & Clark, 2001; Belloch et al., 2004; Hardy & Brewin, 2005; Marcks& Woods, 
2005) used the ROII (Purdon & Clark, 1993, 1994), a self-report measure comprising two 
sections. Section One (52 items) assesses the frequency of obsessional intrusive thoughts, 
images and impulses. Items are rated on a seven-point scale ranging from 0 (“I have 
never had this thought”) to 6 (“I have this thought frequently throughout the day”). 
Section Two pinpoints the most upsetting intrusion endorsed in Section One, which is 
then rated on a number of dimensions (e.g. unpleasantness, guilt). An earlier version of 
the ROII showed good discriminant and concurrent validity (Purdon & Clark, 1993, 
1994).
One study (Purdon et al., 2005) employed the Interpretation of Intrusions 
Inventory (III), a measure with good psychometric properties (Obsessive Compulsive 
Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG), 1997, 2001). This 31-item self-report inventory 
assesses individuals’ interpretations of obsessional thoughts. Ratings regarding
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‘responsibility’, ‘importance of thoughts’, and ‘need to control thoughts’ are made in 
reference to personal examples of recent obsessions. Participants used the most upsetting 
thought recorded in the III as their target thought.
Janeck and Calamari (1999) used a modified version of the ITQ (Edwards & 
Dickerson, 1987). There has been limited investigation into the psychometric properties 
of the original ITQ (Clark & Purdon, 1995). The questionnaire provides descriptions and 
examples of positive and negative intrusive thoughts. Participants are then asked to 
identify a personal example of each thought type from the last two weeks, and rate them 
on a number of attributes. For their study, Janeck and Calamari removed the questions 
pertaining to positive thoughts. They also used a procedure to confirm that the OCD 
patients had selected thoughts related to their core obsessional concerns. This was 
achieved by asking the therapists who assessed the patients to rate the similarity between 
their target thought and their most distressing obsessions. On a range of 0 (“not at all 
similar”) to 10 (“identical”), the mean score was 7.95. Therefore, it did appear that there 
was a strong obsessional element to the target thoughts identified. Whilst the ITQ is 
largely focused upon identifying OCD-type thoughts, some non-clinical controls did 
choose thoughts that seemed more like worries (e.g. failing exams; John Calamari, 
personal communication). With this caveat in mind, the data from the non-clinical group 
are still presented in this review.
Rassin (2001) adopted an intriguing approach derived from a previous study 
(Rachman et al., 1996). Participants were given a piece of paper with the sentence, “I
hope that___________will soon be in a car accident”, and were instructed to fill the gap
with the name of a living person close to them. This was designed to simulate a Thought- 
Action Fusion intrusion (TAF; a cognitive bias implying an inflated sense of 
responsibility for one’s own thoughts and cited as playing a role in the development and
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maintenance of obsessional problems). Moreover, the researcher reported evidence to 
suggest that this manipulation induced obsession-like stress in the study cohort. 
Participants were instructed to monitor thoughts about the accident during the 
experiment.
The remaining three studies used verbal/written instructions or unidentified 
questionnaires (Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994; Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994; McNally & 
Ricciardi, 1996). These were geared towards assisting participants in selecting negative 
intrusive thoughts that were relevant to OCD, both in terms of form and content. 
However, on account of limited information provided by the authors, there is less 
certainty about whether this was actually achieved for all participants.
Experimental conditions
Researchers mostly employed variants of three experimental conditions, 
‘suppression’, ‘non-suppression’, and ‘mention’ (also referred to as ‘free expression’, 
‘record’, and ‘monitor-only’). ‘Non-suppression’ and ‘mention’ were both used as control 
conditions. For the suppression condition, participants were told that they could think 
about anything whilst trying as hard as they could to suppress their target thought. 
However, they were urged to record the times that their target thought did come to mind. 
In the mention condition, participants were instructed to think about anything they liked, 
including their target thought. Again, they were reminded to mark the occasions when 
their target thought did enter their thoughts. Finally, the non-suppression condition was 
an important variant of the mention condition. Participants were told not to suppress any 
thoughts, including their target thought. Again, they had to record the times when their 
target thought did come to mind. These instructions were designed to prevent participants
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in the control condition from engaging in spontaneous suppression attempts in response 
to unwanted thoughts (Purdon & Clark, 2000).
Inspection of Table 3 confirms that additional experimental conditions were used 
by some researchers (Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994; Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994; Marcks 
& Woods, 2005). These are described along with the findings from these studies (see 
later).
Notably, no study employed the expression instructions used by Wegner and 
colleagues (Wegner et al., 1987). These instructions asked participants to think actively 
about the target thought. The ecological validity of these instructions has since been 
questioned, especially when applied to unwanted thoughts (e.g. Merckelbach et al.,
1991).
Finally, in three of the laboratory-based studies (Purdon, 2001; Purdon & Clark, 
2001; Purdon et al., 2005), participants engaged in an attentional task whilst monitoring 
their targets thoughts. Ostensibly, this was used to help maintain focus and prevent 
boredom or daydreaming.
Experimental design
One laboratory-based study employed a crossover design (McNally & Ricciardi, 
1996; see Table 3). It is well documented that order and practice effects confound the 
interpretation of findings from the second block of such studies (e.g. Clark et al., 1991; 
Purdon & Clark, 2000).
The other nine laboratory-based studies used a parallel groups design. This is the 
preferred approach in the field (Abramowitz et al., 2001). Participants tracked the 
frequency of their target thoughts over a series of experimental blocks. Across studies, 
two to five blocks were employed in the series. Within each study, these blocks were
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always of the same time length. Figure 1 represents the experimental structure common 
to eight of the investigations (it does not apply to Hardy and Brewin (2005); see Table 3). 
It is highlighted that abbreviations in Figure 1 are used in subsequent text and tables to 
aid the description of findings from different studies.
[Figure 1 about here]
The naturalistic study (Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994) incorporated a single 4-day 
block during which three groups monitored their targets thoughts under different 
conditions.
Monitoring occurrence o f  target thought
All 11 studies assessed the frequency with which target thoughts occurred. For 
nine of the laboratory-based studies, thought events were marked immediately using a 
computer mouse (4 studies), a bell (1 study), a tally counter (3 studies), or check marks 
on a piece of paper (1 study). For the tenth laboratory-based study (Rassin, 2001), 
participants gave a retrospective estimate of frequency at the end of each block. In the 
one naturalistic study, participants were required to put a tick on a postcard when the 
thought came to mind.
Four laboratory-based studies used an additional measure of thought recurrence 
using either thought streaming (participants vocalise ‘stream-of-consciousness’ into tape 
recorder; 1 study) or visual analogue scales (3 studies). These attempted to capture the 
time devoted to the target thought (3 studies) or the proportion of thoughts related to the 
target thought (1 study).
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Other effects o f suppression
Two studies did not look beyond frequency and duration of target thoughts 
(McNally & Ricciardi, 1996; Hardy & Brewin, 2005). However, the remaining nine 
studies did attempt to examine other effects of thought suppression. These studies used 
quite a range of variables. Their findings are discussed later.
Summary
From the eleven studies, two were conducted with OCD patients. The remainder 
used non-clinical individuals who were mostly experiencing normal levels of obsessional 
symptomatology. Even within a relatively small cohort of studies, it is apparent that 
researchers have applied a range of methodologies in examining thought suppression in 
the context of obsessions.
Effect o f suppression on thought occurrence
Table 4 offers an overview of the findings from the eleven studies which are 
relevant to the purported ‘immediate enhancement’ and ‘rebound’ effects of suppression 
on thought occurrence. Although some investigations examined a variety of target 
thoughts (i.e. obsessive, positive, neutral, general negative intrusions), only data for 
obsessive-type intrusions are presented. For those studies which incorporated a B/L block 
(see Figure 1), ESs are calculated for the suppression group. The results from suppression 
manipulation checks are also included.
[Table 4 about here]
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Belloch and colleagues (2004) generated data which suggested that, rather than 
leading to enhancement/rebound effects, suppression may interfere with the habituation 
of obsessive intrusive thoughts. For their suppression group, there was a significant 
decline in thought frequency between B/L and Exp blocks (see Figure 1), but there was 
no significant difference between Exp and Post-Exp blocks (see Figure 1). In contrast, 
their non-suppression group showed a significant decline in both of these comparisons. 
The authors did not report analyses of the differences between the two groups for any of 
the blocks. However, visual inspection of their means and standard deviations suggests 
that no significant differences would have been revealed. Two more studies (Purdon, 
2001; Purdon & Clark, 2001) presented data which were consistent with the notion that 
suppression may interfere with habituation of OCD-type thoughts.
In a study of OCD patients, Purdon and associates (2005) produced evidence to 
indicate that those under suppression instructions actually had some degree of control. 
The caveat should be raised that this conclusion was based upon simple effects analyses 
of an interaction effect only approaching significance (p<0.08). In the Exp block, the 
suppression group had significantly fewer intrusions than those in the control condition. 
For the Post-Exp block, the difference between groups was non-significant. Visual 
inspection of these data raises questions about whether the two groups were matched in 
terms of pre-experimental intrusion frequency. With this possibility in mind, it is 
acknowledged that the two groups were well matched in terms of their scores on the 
Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS; Goodwin et al., 1989a, 1989b), a 
measure of symptom severity in OCD. They were also matched for mood levels. 
However, the researchers did not report whether psychiatric comorbidity was equivalent 
across groups. In all, this study illustrates the value in employing a B/L block when it 
comes to interpreting frequency data.
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In the only naturalistic study, Trinder and Salkovskis (1994) showed that 
suppressors had significantly more intrusions over the four-day period than the other two 
groups (mention and ‘think through’). This was taken as potential evidence for an 
enhancement effect of suppression. Again, since B/L data were not collected, it is 
impossible to discount the possibility that the difference between groups existed pre- 
experimentally. It is noted however that all three groups were well matched in terms of 
anxiety, depression and obsessional symptomatology. The investigators included the 
‘think through’ condition to control for the salience of suppression instructions; being 
told to suppress or think through requires a thought-focused reaction. The significant 
difference between frequencies for these two groups led the researchers to argue that the 
higher values associated with suppression were due to suppression per se, rather than 
being an effect of salience of the instructions. On account of the study design though, it is 
difficult to establish whether this enhancement occurred whilst participants actually 
suppressed. Instead, there remains the possibility that suppression effort fluctuated over 
the four days and that increases in frequency were due to rebound effects in periods when 
suppression effort was low. In light of this possibility, Trinder and Salkovskis conducted 
a detailed analysis of discomfort ratings over the four days. This indicated that the 
suppression group did not experience greater fluctuations or extremes in discomfort 
relative to the other two groups. Such fluctuations would be expected if thought rebound 
was occurring in intermittent periods of low suppression effort. It was therefore 
concluded that the pattern of findings was more consistent with suppression effort 
remaining constant during the study and leading to a concurrent increase in frequency.
In the second study using OCD patients (Janeck & Calamari, 1999), it was found 
that the two OCD groups (suppression and control) had significantly more intrusions than 
the two non-clinical groups. Thought occurrence also dropped significantly over the
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course of the blocks. No other significant effects emerged. There was a suggestion that 
compared with non-clinical controls who suppressed, more OCD patients who suppressed 
showed a rebound effect (NC: 0/16 vs. OCD: 4/16). However, this conclusion was based 
upon Pearson’s % analysis of very small numbers and must be interpreted with caution.
In their laboratory-based study of suppression, Salkovskis and Campbell (1994) 
employed five groups of participants (see Table 3). In the comparison of frequencies for 
the suppression and mention groups, it was found that the suppression group had 
significantly more intrusions across both Exp and Post-Exp blocks. This difference was 
shown to be constant over the two blocks, thereby indicating that a rebound effect of 
suppression had not manifested. Overall, these findings were viewed as further evidence 
for suppression resulting in increased intrusion. The role of distraction was examined by 
employing the other three experimental conditions. It was found that suppression with 
general distraction instructions still resulted in enhancement, but either telling people not 
to distract or providing distraction by way of a task, seemed to abolish the effect. The 
authors were uncertain about the implications for these findings and recommended 
further research.
Of the remaining 4 studies, only one claimed to have demonstrated an immediate 
enhancement effect of suppression (Marcks & Woods, 2005). In order to establish 
whether such an effect manifested, Marcks and Woods employed a one-way ANCOVA 
for scores in the Exp block, using frequency of target thoughts in the B/L block as a 
covariate. Analysis revealed that, relative to the mention group, the suppression group 
had significantly more thoughts in the Exp block. This was taken as evidence for an 
immediate enhancement effect. Yet, inspection of the scores in Table 4 confirms that no 
such effect manifested; the frequency of thoughts for the suppression group dropped 
between B/L and Exp blocks. Instead, it does appear that, in line with Belloch and
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colleagues (2004), the suppression group may have shown an attenuated rate of decline in 
obsessional thoughts across the blocks. Unfortunately, the authors’ choice of analysis 
procedure prohibits further elucidation on this possibility. This would have been possible 
had they employed repeated measures ANOVA. In fact, the investigators did use repeated 
measures ANCOVA when it came to analysing for changes between the Exp and Post- 
Exp blocks. Again, they took frequency in the B/L block as a covariate. The interaction 
effect between group and block was found to be non-significant and accordingly, it was 
concluded that no rebound effect had occurred. They did not report the outcomes for the 
main effects of group and block.
The final three studies failed to produce empirical data in support of the purported 
immediate enhancement and rebound effects. In fact, Rassin (2001) showed that, 
compared with the non-suppression control condition, those under suppression 
instructions exhibited some degree of relative control in terms of the amount of time 
spent thinking about the accident. However, the equivalent effect did not emerge in the 
analysis of intrusion frequency data. Again, no B/L measures of thought occurrence were 
taken in this study. Given that the target thought was effectively supplied by the 
experimenter, it would have been helpful to confirm that this manipulation had had an 
equivalent impact in both groups prior to entering the suppression/non-suppression 
conditions. Hardy and Brewin (2005) used a novel approach to assess the effects of 
suppression (see Table 3). Even so, they did not demonstrate enhancement or rebound 
effects. Finally, in the only study to employ a crossover design, McNally and Ricciardi 
(1996) did not find an enhancement effect due to suppression in the first block. On 
account of the difficulty in interpreting performance in the second block of a crossover 
design, the associated findings are not discussed.
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In summary, of the eleven studies included in this review, none provide empirical 
support for the notion that suppression leads to a subsequent rebound in obsessive 
intrusive thought occurrence. Two studies generated data indicating that suppression may 
cause an immediate enhancement in thoughts, although interpretation of these data would 
have been assisted by the inclusion of B/L blocks. For those investigations where it was 
possible to calculate ESs, the vast majority went in the opposite direction to expectation 
(i.e. negative values). Some studies found that, rather than leading to 
enhancement/rebound effects, suppression interferes with the natural habituation of 
unwanted thoughts. Finally, others showed that suppression may, in fact, bestow some 
control over thought occurrence.
Beyond thought occurrence
Table 5 offers an overview of the findings pertaining to effects of suppression 
which go beyond thought occurrence. Since researchers have had ranging interests, there 
is limited consistency both in the effects that have been examined and in the manner in 
which they have been assessed. Accordingly, in contrast to the results for thought 
occurrence, it was a challenge to extract any general conclusions. In spite of this, findings 
are discussed, divided into two realms: (1) discomfort (including distress and 
unpleasantness); and (2) other measures (e.g. responsibility, guilt, acceptability).
[Table 5 about here]
Discomfort/distress/unpleasantness
In the only naturalistic study (Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994), the suppression group 
rated their thoughts as significantly more uncomfortable than the mention group over the
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four days. This matched the findings in relation to frequency of target thoughts over this 
period. It might have been expected that thinking through an obsessional thought would 
lead to improved emotional processing. In fact, the ‘think through’ group reported higher 
levels of discomfort than the mention group, although this difference was non-significant. 
Perhaps one of the most significant findings in the study was in relation to the discomfort 
ratings given during and after the habituation sequence in session 2 (after the four days). 
For the habituation sequence, participants were asked to imagine the thought as clearly as 
possible, and then, when they had done this, record their discomfort. This was done five 
times, with one minute between each occasion. At the end of the sequence, the thoughts 
were again rated for discomfort, along with a number of other measures. The purpose of 
this procedure was to examine whether suppression influenced the natural habituation of 
unwanted thoughts. If so, it was expected that the group who suppressed over the 
previous four days would show a different pattern of discomfort during and after the 
habituation sequence. In fact, analysis of scores in session 2, covarying for scores at 
session 1, found no significant effects involving group. Obviously, this contrasted with 
the findings for the discomfort ratings collected during the previous four days. Trinder 
and Salkovskis were alert to the possibility that this effect suggested intrusive thoughts 
formed in a laboratory setting are not experienced in the same way as those occurring in 
the natural setting. Obviously, such a possibility has important implications for 
laboratory-based research of thought suppression.
Purdon and Clark (2001) employed VASs to assess discomfort and 
unpleasantness in relation to the intrusions experienced during the Exp and Post-Exp 
blocks. For discomfort scores, both groups dropped significantly over the two blocks. In 
the Exp block, the difference between groups was non-significant. However, in the Post- 
Exp block, the suppression group experienced significantly more discomfort than the
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non-suppression group. In the analysis of unpleasantness ratings, no significant effects 
emerged. The findings for discomfort were similar to those for thought frequency and 
provided further support for the notion that suppression may interfere with the 
habituation of obsessive intrusive thoughts.
Marcks and Woods (2005) conducted a study with a strong emphasis on clinical 
utility. They compared thought suppression with an acceptance-based technique for 
impact on discomfort accompanying unwanted thoughts. An acceptance-based approach 
(e.g. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy; ACT; Hayes et al., 1999) focuses on 
increasing one’s willingness to experience uncomfortable thoughts and feelings without 
avoiding, struggling with, or viewing them as being true. By engendering a perspective in 
which thoughts and feelings are simply noticed, the negative impact of such events 
should diminish (Hayes et al., 1996).
Marcks and Woods found that the suppression group manifested a significant 
increase in discomfort between Exp and Post-Exp blocks. Therefore, suppression 
produced a ‘rebound’ in distress (the rebound effect did not emerge for thought 
frequencies). In contrast, the acceptance group showed a significant decrease in 
discomfort between these blocks, whilst ratings remained stable in the mention control 
group. Therefore, even though the acceptance group experienced thoughts at a similar 
rate to the suppression and mention groups, these individuals reported a significant 
improvement in associated discomfort. These data offered initial evidence to support the 
idea that acceptance may help in dealing with unwanted thoughts. Unfortunately, the 
researchers did not report their findings for ‘acceptance’ ratings taken during the 
experiment. Also, inspection of their data reveals that discomfort ratings for the 
acceptance group were higher than those for the mention control group. The authors did 
not comment on this outcome.
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Salkovskis and Campbell (1994) found no significant effects in their analysis of 
discomfort ratings given by the suppression and mention groups. Therefore, although the 
suppression group experienced significantly more intrusions over the course of the study, 
these individuals did not record greater discomfort. The role of distraction was then 
examined by analysing the data from all five experimental groups (see Table 3). There 
was a significant interaction between group and block. This was almost entirely 
accounted for by the ‘suppression whilst carrying out a distracting task’ group. For this 
group, there was a sharp contrast between Exp and Post-Exp blocks, an effect that was 
not seen in the other groups. Specifically, whilst carrying out a distracting task in the Exp 
block, their discomfort was considerably reduced. The authors were uncertain about the 
implications for these findings and recommended further research.
Two studies (Purdon, 2001; Purdon et al., 2005), one of which recruited OCD 
patients, measured anxiety associated with the target thought during both the Exp and 
Post-Exp blocks. Neither study documented repeated measures ANOVA for these data. 
Instead, an alternative approach was adopted to examine the impact of suppression upon 
distress. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were employed to identify predictors 
of anxiety caused by thought occurrences in the Exp block only. For both studies, neither 
experimental group nor thought frequency in the Exp block was found to be a significant 
unique predictor. Perhaps more importantly, neither study found that the interaction 
between group and frequency predicted distress. This variable was included on the basis 
that thought occurrences whilst suppressing might be more disturbing than those 
experienced whilst trying not to suppress. In both studies, scores from the III (see earlier) 
and the Concerns over Failure in Thought Control Questionnaire (CFTQ; Purdon, 2001) 
were also entered into the regression analyses. The CFTQ is a novel measure which 
provides an immediate assessment regarding the impact of thought recurrences.
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Specifically, it examines how these thought recurrences influence appraisals reflecting 
responsibility, thought-fusion, and control beliefs implicated in conceptualisations of 
OCD. Little work has been conducted into the psychometric properties of the CFTQ and 
its two subscales (‘need to control’, ‘fusion/dystonicity’) are based upon face validity 
alone. However, with both students and OCD patients, the subscales have exhibited 
strong internal consistency (Purdon, 2001; Purdon et al., 2005).
The III was administered prior to the experimental blocks. By virtue of the fact 
that the CFTQ assesses in vivo appraisals of thought recurrences, it was given to 
participants after the Post-Exp block. However, they were asked to base their answers 
solely upon their experiences in the Exp block. Obviously, this is problematic. It is 
acknowledged though that the researchers chose not to administer it straight after the Exp 
block because they did not want to disturb potential rebound effects in the Post-Exp block 
(Christine Purdon, personal communication). Purdon (2001) found that the ‘importance 
of thoughts’ subscale from the III and the ‘fusion/dystonicity’ subscale of the CFTQ 
emerged as significant unique predictors. The former indicates that increased beliefs 
about thoughts having moral implications and portending future events, were associated 
with more anxiety. The latter reflects that greater concerns about the thought coming true 
or about it revealing negative aspects of one’s personality were associated with greater 
discomfort.
In the other study which used this approach (Purdon et al., 2005), the 
‘fusion/dystonicity’ subscale of the CFTQ was also shown to be a significant unique 
predictor. Taken together, these findings demonstrated that, for both students and OCD 
patients, negative thought appraisals were associated with greater levels of anxiety in the 
Exp block, irrespective of whether participants were suppressing or not suppressing.
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Three other studies employed some measure of discomfort (Janeck & Calamari, 
1999; Rassin, 2001; Belloch et al., 2004). Janeck and Calamari (1999) found that, relative 
to non-clinical controls, OCD patients experienced significantly more distress on account 
of their intrusions. Distress ratings also significantly decreased for all participants over 
the experimental blocks. No other effects were significant. In another investigation, 
equivalent findings were reported for unpleasantness ratings taken at pre- and post­
experiment (Belloch et al., 2004). Finally, Rassin (2001) assessed general anxiety (i.e. not 
specific to the target thought) at the end of each block. Again, scores decreased 
significantly over the course of the experiment, but there were no significant effects 
involving group.
In summary, a mixed picture emerges with respect to discomfort-type ratings.
Two studies (Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994; Marcks & Woods, 2005) generated data 
indicating that suppression led to heightened levels of discomfort. For one of these 
studies (Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994), the effect manifested for discomfort during the 
four-day naturalistic phase, but not in the laboratory. Purdon and Clark (2001) provided 
further support for the notion that suppression may, instead, interfere with the habituation 
of obsessive intrusive thoughts. In contrast, the other six studies did not find that 
suppression instructions influenced distress levels. Finally, two studies highlighted that 
negative appraisals predict discomfort associated with the recurrence of unwanted 
thoughts (Purdon, 2001; Purdon et al., 2005). In considering the overall findings, two 
caveats are raised. First, researchers employed subtly different measures across studies. 
Second, in light of the effects of suppression upon thought occurrence, a limited impact 
on discomfort ratings would perhaps be expected.
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Other measures
Belloch and colleagues (2004) assessed annoyance caused by not being able to 
avoid having the target thought in the Exp and Post-Exp blocks. For the control group, 
annoyance dropped significantly between the Exp and Post-Exp blocks. Whilst 
annoyance also decreased in the suppression group, this change was non-significant. The 
authors did not report whether there were significant group differences for either block. 
Even so, the findings tallied with their results for thought frequency and strengthened the 
argument that suppression may interfere with the natural habituation of unwanted 
thoughts. In the same study, it was shown that guilt associated with having the thought 
diminished for both groups over the course of the experiment. However, the experimental 
group did not significantly modify this effect. The findings regarding ‘worry about the 
consequences of having the thought’ were not reported.
Trinder and Salkovskis (1994) used a number of variables to assess target thought 
appraisals after the habituation sequences in sessions 1 and 2: ease of formation, urge to 
put right, urge to distract, acceptability, and controllability. No significant effects 
involving group were revealed.
Salkovskis and Campbell (1994) also administered controllability and 
acceptability scales. For the former, they did not report their findings. Analysis of the 
acceptability scores from the mention and suppression groups found no significant 
effects. When the data from all five groups in this study were examined, a significant 
interaction between group and block emerged. Further exploration revealed that during 
the Exp block, the ‘suppression whilst carrying out a distracting task’ group rated their 
thoughts as significantly more acceptable than in the Post-Exp block. This mirrored the 
effects found for discomfort and thought frequency (see above). The results combined 
suggest that suppression, at least in the short term, is an effective control strategy when
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individuals distract themselves with a specific task. The authors did not provide any 
details regarding the task administered.
Rassin (2001) generated data indicating that suppression may, in the short-term, 
diminish the strength of negative appraisals of TAF-like intrusions (participants were 
given an unfinished sentence describing a car accident and were asked to complete it by 
adding the name of a loved one). Relative to the non-suppression control group, the 
suppression group judged that completing the sentence was less morally wrong and that 
the accident was less likely to occur. The interpretation of these findings is complicated 
by the fact that these variables were first assessed after the Exp block. The study would 
have benefited from conducting an assessment of participants’ views regarding the TAF- 
like intrusion prior to any experimental manipulation.
Purdon and Clark (2001) employed responsibility and unacceptability measures. 
For both, analyses were reported for all 6 experimental groups together (two groups each 
for positive, negative, and obsessional target thoughts). In terms of responsibility for 
having the thought, there was a significant decrease between the Exp and Post-Exp 
blocks. No effect involving suppression or thought type (positive, neutral, negative) 
approached significance. As expected, it was significantly more unacceptable to have 
obsessional thoughts than positive or neutral thoughts. Also, in the Exp block, those who 
suppressed target thoughts of any valence found them to be significantly more 
unacceptable than those who did not suppress. This is despite the fact that suppression did 
not cause an immediate enhancement in frequency for any of the three thought types. 
Overall, these findings suggest that that the instruction to suppress any thought may 
activate performance demands that participants expect themselves to meet. In failing to 
meet these demands entirely, the thoughts are then viewed as unacceptable. This
56
Chapter 2 Systematic Review
conclusion highlights a potentially important role for pre-existing beliefs about thought 
control capability.
Purdon and Clark (2001) also examined the effect of suppressing thoughts on 
mood state, as assessed using the Mood Measure. This instrument was derived from 
another measure (Howell & Conway, 1992) and is designed to assess positive and 
negative transient mood states. Little work has been conducted into its psychometric 
properties, although the 16 items have been found to load onto one factor. The scale also 
shows high internal consistency (Purdon & Clark, 2001). Correlational analyses showed 
that higher thought frequency for the group who suppressed obsessional thoughts was 
associated with more negative mood at post-experiment. This relationship was not found 
for the other 5 groups. Whilst causality is difficult to determine, this suggests that 
recurrence of suppressed obsessional thoughts is detrimental to mood. In fact, the 
relationship is likely to be bi-directional. Previous research has revealed a relationship 
between negative mood and difficulty in suppressing negative thoughts (Wenzlaff et al., 
1988, 1991; Conway et al., 1991), and that thoughts are more difficult to dismiss during 
negative mood (Edwards & Dickerson, 1987; Sutherland et al., 1982). Thus, any decline 
in mood state is likely to make thought occurrences even more frequent, thereby further 
impacting upon mood.
Finally, another two studies have measured mood state at both pre- and post­
experiment (Purdon, 2001; Purdon et al., 2005). Again, mood was assessed using the 
Mood Measure (Purdon & Clark, 2001). Neither study documented repeated measures 
ANOVA for these data. Instead, hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted 
to identify predictors of post-experimental mood state. As expected, both investigations 
found that pre-experimental mood predicted post-experimental mood. Group, total 
thought frequency (over the two blocks), and subscale scores from the III were not
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significant independent predictors. However, Purdon (2001) reported that the interaction 
between group and total thought frequency did emerge as a significant predictor. Perhaps 
surprisingly, greater thought frequency was associated with more negative mood in the 
control group (non-suppression), but not in the suppression group. These effects 
contrasted starkly with the findings revealed by Purdon and Clark (2001; discussed 
above). Finally, for both studies, subscale scores on the CFTQ predicted mood state. 
Therefore, more negative appraisals of thought recurrences were associated with more 
negative mood.
As an interesting aside, these last two studies (Purdon, 2001; Purdon et al., 2005) 
also explored predictors of suppression effort in the non-suppression control group. This 
was based upon the observation that individuals under non-suppression instructions often 
exert significant suppression effort. Suppression effort by the non-suppression group in 
the Exp block was the dependent variable. Purdon (2001) found that greater thought 
frequency predicted greater suppression effort. Also, the ‘need to control’ subscale from 
the CFTQ emerged as a significant unique predictor. Thus, the greater the perceived 
necessity of thought control, the greater the suppression effort. Purdon and colleagues 
(2005) also revealed the latter relationship.
Again, this brief overview reveals a mixed picture. The one clear finding is of a 
research literature somewhat in its infancy, making it difficult to extract a general 
consensus. One study provided further support for the notion that suppression interferes 
with habituation of obsessive thoughts (Belloch et al., 2004). In contrast, Rassin (2001) 
demonstrated that, at least in the short-term, this form of mental control serves to 
alleviate negative appraisals of TAF-like intrusions. Salkovskis and Campbell (1994) also 
showed that, in the right conditions (i.e. whilst conducting a distracting task), suppression 
increases the acceptability of unpleasant intrusions. This finding highlights the need to
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explore further the different strategies used by individuals to suppress their thoughts. 
Indeed, as discussed in previous work (e.g. Smari, 2001), the instruction to suppress is 
likely to trigger a range of different processes in different circumstances and people. It is 
plausible that some may be more helpful than others. In the last few years, Purdon and 
colleagues (Purdon, 2001; Purdon et al., 2005) have examined the role of appraisals of 
thought recurrence. They found that negative appraisals are associated with lower post- 
experimental mood, irrespective of whether participants suppress or not. Finally, it has 
been common for researchers to employ measures for which no significant effects of 
suppression were revealed or for which they failed to report the findings.
Discussion
The present review synthesised findings from experimental studies that had 
investigated the effects of suppressing OCD-type thoughts. The review was motivated by 
the fact that thought suppression has been commonly cited as an important factor in the 
development and maintenance of obsessional problems (Salkovskis, 1989, 1998; Clark & 
Purdon, 1993; Rachman, 1997, 1998; Clark, 2004).
Effect o f suppression on thought occurrence
The first striking finding was that none of the 11 studies included in this review 
provided evidence for the purported ‘rebound’ effect of suppression (cf. Wegner et al., 
1987). In other words, no study found that suppression of obsessive intrusive thoughts led 
to a subsequent surge in their occurrence. Moreover, where it was possible to calculate 
effect sizes for suppression groups, all effects went in the opposite direction to prediction. 
For example, in the study of highest methodological quality (Belloch et al., 2004), there 
was a medium effect size for a decrease in frequency between B/L and Post-Exp blocks.
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With respect to an ‘immediate enhancement’ effect, the overall picture was more 
equivocal. Two studies (Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994; Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994) 
found that whilst suppressing, participants experienced significantly more thoughts than 
those who simply monitored. Interpretation of findings from these two studies would 
have been aided, however, by the inclusion of B/L blocks. As it stands, it cannot be 
discounted that the differences between groups existed pre-experimentally. The 
remaining nine studies found no evidence for the ‘immediate enhancement’ effect. 
Moreover, of the seven effect sizes calculated, six went in the opposite direction to 
prediction. In the one exception, the effect size was negligible (ES=+0.09).
An interesting conclusion drawn in some of the studies was that, rather than 
leading to enhancement/rebound effects, suppression may attenuate the natural 
habituation of unwanted thoughts (Purdon, 2001; Purdon & Clark, 2001; Belloch et al., 
2004). Whilst such an eventuality would not be as dramatic as enhancement or rebound 
effects, it would still be of significance to our understanding of the maintenance of 
obsessions. Some possible reasons for how suppression may interfere with habituation 
are discussed later.
Finally, one investigation demonstrated that suppression can be relatively 
advantageous in the short term (Rassin, 2001). In fact, this was true for thought 
occurrence and negative appraisals. A study of OCD patients (Purdon et al., 2005) also 
provided tentative evidence that suppression can bestow some control over obsessional 
thoughts. Neither of these studies included B/L blocks, thereby limiting confidence in the 
conclusions. Yet, both serve to illustrate the possibility that suppression may be helpful in 
some circumstances.
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Beyond thought occurrence
Bearing in mind the limited effects of suppression on thought occurrence, there 
might be little expectation with respect to findings on other variables. Indeed, the present 
review found that, for the majority of measures employed across studies (see Table 5), no 
significant effects involving suppression were reported.
For the two studies that demonstrated that suppression leads to relative increases 
in intrusions (Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994; Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994), there were 
mixed findings from the other variables employed. Given its design, perhaps the most 
informative effects were revealed in the naturalistic study (Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994). 
During this four-day experiment, the suppression group not only had significantly more 
intrusions, but also experienced more discomfort when these thoughts manifested. 
Intriguingly, on return to the laboratory, the effect on discomfort ratings disappeared. 
Despite the lack of a B/L block, this study, which ranked third in terms of methodological 
quality, generated strong naturalistic data indicating that suppression may be partially 
responsible for the persistence of obsessional problems.
Throughout the current review, it has been mooted that, rather than causing 
dramatic increases in thought occurrence, suppression may impede the natural habituation 
of obsessional thoughts (Purdon, 2001; Purdon & Clark, 2001; Belloch et al., 2004). 
Findings on variables beyond occurrence support this possibility (Purdon & Clark, 2001; 
Belloch et al., 2004). Purdon and Clark (2001) gave two plausible explanations for how 
suppression might interfere with habituation. First, suppression terminates exposure to a 
thought, in a similar way to completion of rituals. This precludes the opportunity to leam 
that particular catastrophic consequences of having the thought will not occur (Rachman, 
1997, 1998; Salkovskis, 1985, 1989, 1998). Second, instructions to suppress may prime 
beliefs that thoughts can and should be controlled. Individuals who view failure in control
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as a sign of mental weakness will interpret recurrences of the target thought as highly 
significant (Clark & Purdon, 1993; Purdon & Clark, 1999). This will serve to maintain 
the negativity associated with the thought during active suppression.
Purdon and colleagues (Purdon, 2001; Purdon et al., 2005) have also attempted to 
broaden the scope of thought suppression research by exploring the dynamic interactions 
cited within cognitive-behavioural models of OCD, in addition to the effects of 
suppression on frequency. They have shown that, both with undergraduates and OCD 
patients, the meaning attached to thought recurrences (e.g. need to control), irrespective 
of experimental condition, is associated with suppression effort, discomfort and more 
negative mood. Thus, understanding the personal significance of thought recurrences 
might be of central importance to understanding obsessional problems. Furthermore, 
cognitive restructuring of individuals’ interpretations of thought recurrences may be 
required before they feel able to disengage from control attempts.
Limitations o f included studies
Overall, there was a broad range in methodological quality ratings for the 11 
studies (33% - 75%). Only two studies fell within the high quality range. Eight 
investigations were of moderate quality and one was of low quality. In light of this, a case 
may be made for replicating some studies using greater methodological rigour, thereby 
enhancing confidence in the findings. Moreover, it could be argued that a lack of high 
quality studies partially explains the failure to reveal the purported rebound effect of 
suppression. Yet, in the two studies judged to be of high quality (Belloch et al., 2004; 
Purdon et al., 2005), there was no evidence for rebound or immediate enhancement 
effects.
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Nine of the 11 studies recruited analogue samples, 8 of which were from student 
populations. In many cases, participants were paid or given course credits for their time. 
The remaining 2 studies used OCD patients. The analogue cohorts were either unscreened 
or selected on the basis of simple screening procedures designed to ensure that 
individuals had experienced at least one obsessive intrusion in the recent past. Given the 
high prevalence of OCD-like intrusions (e.g. Rachman & de Silva, 1978), the latter were 
not especially stringent. Other than in the investigation conducted by Salkovskis and 
Campbell (1994), no analogue study made a concerted effort to recruit individuals 
experiencing obsessional symptomatology to a significant degree. Overall, the fact that 
most studies used healthy student populations is problematic in that it weakens the 
generalisability of their respective findings.
Perhaps the most striking observation was that 10 of the 11 studies were 
laboratory-based. For these studies, experimental blocks ranged from 3 to 6 minutes. 
Again, this raises serious questions about the ecological validity of the findings. Briefly 
monitoring obsessional thoughts in an artificial environment bears limited relation to the 
experience of dealing with these thoughts in everyday life.
All of the studies failed to report power calculations and 7 investigations had at 
least one group with fewer than 20 participants. Both of these observations point to the 
possibility that some of the studies were poorly powered.
All studies measured frequency of thoughts. Apart from Rassin (2001), 
researchers employed an event marking procedure. Whilst there is some consensus that 
this is the preferred approach (e.g. Purdon & Clark, 2000), it does have drawbacks. In 
particular, the issue of what constitutes an independent thought event is always going to 
be problematic. To complement frequency data and thereby generate a broader picture, 
four studies used a second measure of thought occurrence. These tapped into the amount
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of time spent thinking about, or the proportion of thoughts related to, the target thought. 
The failure of the remaining seven studies to employ a second measure of thought 
occurrence is a limitation.
A variety of approaches were employed to identify target thoughts. Three studies 
used verbal/written instructions or unidentified questionnaires (Salkovskis & Campbell, 
1994; Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994; McNally & Ricciardi, 1996). Although these were 
geared towards selecting thoughts relevant to OCD, there may be some doubt that this 
was always achieved. In this regard, it would have been helpful if the authors had 
documented the content of the thoughts selected, if indeed this information was collected. 
Looking at all 11 studies, only three provided any information regarding the content of 
the target thoughts (Purdon et al., 2001; Rassin, 2001; Belloch et al., 2004).
Seven studies did not obtain baseline data for thought occurrences. This prevented 
the calculation of effect sizes for ‘immediate enhancement’ and ‘rebound’ effects, and 
complicated the interpretation of findings.
Limitations o f this review
This review focused exclusively upon experimental studies that used OCD-like 
intrusions as target thoughts. Consequently, other studies of thought suppression, some of 
which may have been relevant to the issues discussed in this review, were not included. 
For instance, some questionnaire-based investigations have examined the relationships 
between suppression, appraisals, thought frequency and OCD symptomatology (e.g.
Smari & Holmsteinsson, 2001; for a review, see Purdon, 2004). Correlational designs 
avoid the difficulty of creating naturalistic suppression experiments. On the other hand, 
inferences about causality are weaker.
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In addition, the methodological quality checklist was developed ‘in house’ for the 
purposes of this review. Therefore, although based upon existing measures and guidelines 
(Downs & Black, 1998; Khan et al., 2001), overall quality scores should be viewed as an 
indication of methodological rigour.
Recommendations for future research
This review has clearly demonstrated that there is a short-term, laboratory-based 
bias in the experimental studies examining suppression of OCD-like thoughts. Indeed, 
this observation can be applied to the thought suppression literature in general. It is 
acknowledged that short-term, laboratory-based studies have been helpful in building our 
understanding of this mental control strategy. Even so, the author strongly urges that 
investigators look towards broadening the scope of their research by carrying out studies 
in participants’ everyday settings, and over longer time periods. Although such an 
approach is more demanding, findings will have greater ecological validity, and should 
be more informative to clinical practice.
There is a dearth in empirical investigations which have recruited either OCD 
patients or participants displaying high levels of obsessionality. Given the prominence 
afforded to thought suppression in cognitive-behavioural conceptualisations of the 
maintenance of obsessional problems, this must be rectified.
An observation made throughout this review is that interpretation of effects would 
have been aided if relevant baseline data had been collected. Accordingly, for future 
research, researchers should employ a baseline period in their investigations. Some 
authors have raised concerns that a baseline period may lead to the habituation of target 
thoughts, thereby diminishing its salience during the critical suppression condition. There 
are, however, a number points that can be made in response to this. One, the finding that
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unwanted thoughts habituate may be interesting in itself. Two, employment of a control 
group would still allow comparisons to be made regarding the effects of suppression. 
Three, the possibility that target thoughts may habituate to insignificant levels is perhaps 
more indicative of the fact that studies have tended to recruit healthy volunteers who have 
rarely experienced their target thoughts prior to the experiment, and who report limited 
discomfort on account of them.
In reviewing the literature, it seems that commentators often focus upon the 
experimental factors (e.g. type of event marking procedure, control condition 
instructions) which best predict the manifestation of immediate enhancement and 
rebound effects for thought occurrences. Whilst this is an interesting line of enquiry, there 
is a danger that this leads researchers down the path of trying to identify the ‘magic 
formula’ for obtaining predicted effects. Instead, especially when considering clinical 
problems, it would be more helpful to characterise, as broadly as possible, what happens 
when individuals try to suppress their unwanted thoughts within natural settings.
Thought suppression researchers have also tended not to broach the issue of how 
individuals try to suppress. Indeed, the instruction to suppress a thought is likely to 
trigger a range of different processes in different circumstances and people (Smari, 2001). 
Only one study included in this review (Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994) instructed 
participants on how to suppress their target thoughts. With the possibility that some 
strategies may be more helpful than others in dealing with obsessional thoughts, it is clear 
how the existing literature can be extended. Similarly, the study conducted by Marcks 
and Woods (2005) will hopefully set a precedent for comparing the effects of suppression 
with those of therapy-based approaches in managing obsessive intrusions.
Active resistance is a defining feature of obsessional thoughts. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to query whether asking people to suppress these thoughts demands a change
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in behaviour (Tolin et al., 2002; Purdon, 2004). Moreover, for six studies included in the 
present review, control instructions stipulated that participants try not to suppress any 
thoughts, including their target thought (non-suppression). This may well be asking them 
to act contrary to their natural inclinations. Overall, it could be argued that suppression is 
a non-intervention and non-suppression is an active condition. This then raises doubts 
about the utility of the non-suppression control condition, rendering comparisons between 
suppression and non-suppression potentially meaningless. In discussing this issue,
Purdon (2001) suggests that it may be more fruitful for researchers to look at natural 
suppression effort. In so doing, it would be necessary to carry out more studies using 
correlational designs.
Finally, as outlined in this review, there has been growing interest in examining 
effects beyond thought occurrence. To date, the emphasis has been upon discomfort-type 
measures. Future research should continue to build the links between empirical work and 
cognitive theories of OCD by not only examining the impact of suppression on thought 
occurrence and discomfort, but also upon other thought appraisals cited in these theories 
(e.g. beliefs about the need to control thoughts, responsibility).
Conclusion
In summary, the current review demonstrates that, to date, there is no firm 
experimental evidence that suppression of OCD-type intrusions leads to a subsequent 
surge in these thoughts (i.e. rebound effect). Moreover, there is very limited support for 
the immediate enhancement effect of suppression. Of 14 effect size calculations, only one 
went in the predicted direction (ES=+0.09). With respect to variables other than 
occurrence, findings are mixed. Some studies offer tentative evidence that suppression 
may interfere with the natural habituation of obsessive intrusions. Whilst this may not be
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as remarkable as purported enhancement/rebound effects, it could still play an important 
role in the maintenance of obsessions.
Overall then, experimental studies offer little credence to the citation of thought 
suppression in conceptualisations of obsessional problems. However, the extant literature 
is lacking in many respects. With this in mind, it is urged that researchers move away 
from the laboratory-based approach and conduct studies over longer time periods and 
within participants’ everyday environment. The research area would also benefit from 
more investigations using clinical samples, or, at the very least, participants experiencing 
higher levels of obsessive symptomatology.
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Table 1. Fourteen papers that were excluded after reading the full text. The reasons for 
their exclusion are provided. ____________________________________________
Study Reason for exclusion
Brewin & Beaton (2002) The target thought was a ‘white bear’.
Brewin & Smart (2005)
The study was mainly focused upon assessing the 
relationship between working memory capacity and 
the ability to suppress obsessional thoughts in a single 
group of participants.
Clark et al. (1993) The target thought related to a story about a ‘green rabbit’.
Kelly & Kahn (1994)
The content of intrusive thoughts selected by 
participants was widespread (e.g. academic 
performance, relationships, future in general); in other 
words, the study was not especially focused upon 
assessing the effects of suppressing ego-dystonic 
intrusive thoughts, images, and impulses.
Kelly & Nauta (1997) As for Kelly & Kahn (1994).
Lavy & Van Den Hout (1990) The target thought related to ‘vehicles’.
Muris et al. (1993) The target thought was a ‘white bear’.
Muris et al. (1996) As for Kelly & Kahn (1994).
Rutledge et al. (1996) The target thought was a ‘white bear’.
Rutledge (1998) As for Kelly & Kahn (1994).
Smari et al. (1994)
For some participants, the target thought related to a 
depressing story about a car crash in which a baby 
dies. For the remaining participants, the story was 
emotionally neutral.
Smari et al. (1995) As for Kelly & Kahn (1994).
Smari & Hermodsdottir (2001) As for Kelly & Kahn (1994).
Tolin et al. (2002) The target thought was a ‘white bear’.
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Table 2. Methodological quality ratings given to each of the selected papers. Individual 
checklist items are described in detail in Appendix 2.2.
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Chapter 2 Systematic Review
Figure 1. Representation of the experimental structure common to eight of the 
laboratory-based studies that employed a parallel groups design. It is stressed that some 
researchers did not conduct a baseline block (dashed) and that some studies recruited 
more than two groups. Control condition refers to either ‘mention’ or ‘non-suppression’ 
instructions. Abbreviations in parentheses are used in the subsequent text and tables.
Suppression Group Control Group
Control condition 
(B/L)
Control condition 
(B/L)
1 1
Suppression condition 
(Exp)
Control condition 
(Exp)
1 1
Control condition 
(Post-Exp)
Control condition 
(Post-Exp)
ABBREVIATIONS: B/L = Baseline; Exp = Experimental; Post-Exp = Post-Experimental.
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Chapter 3
Major Research Project Proposal
An investigation into the effects of thought suppression in 
a group of high worriers
For the Major Research Project reported in Chapter 4, a significant amendment was made to the protocol 
described in this proposal. This amendment is introduced at the end o f this chapter. Both protocols were 
approved by the Local Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix 3.2).
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Summary:
Wells’ metacognitive model of Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD; Wells,
1995) predicts that thought suppression plays a key role in the maintenance of worry 
about worry. The present study is designed to examine this prediction. Two groups of 
high worriers will be recruited. Participants will be asked to identify their most potent 
current worry. They will be required to rate this worry on a number of dimensions 
including the amount of distress caused, its controllability, and the impact of the worry 
upon their general physical, mental and social well-being. The experiment itself will 
consist of three phases, each lasting for five minutes. At the end of each of these phases, 
subjects will be required to make the same ratings described above. During all three 
phases, subjects will monitor and record thought occurrences related to their identified 
worry. For Phase 1, all subjects will be told that they can think about anything, including 
their worry. In Phase 2, one group (Suppression group) will be told to suppress thoughts 
about their worry and the other group (Mention group) will continue as in Phase 1. For 
Phase 3, the instructions from Phase 1 will apply. Based upon Wells’ model, it is 
hypothesised that, relative to the Mention group, the Suppression group will demonstrate 
an increase in the frequency of thoughts related to their worry during Phase 3. 
Furthermore, at the end of the experimental procedure, their concerns about the 
uncontrollability and harmful effects of worry will be inflated.
1. Introduction
1.1. Thought suppression
A seminal investigation by Wegner and colleagues (Wegner et al., 1987) has had 
a remarkable impact upon subsequent conceptualisations of specific emotional disorders. 
For the first phase of this study, participants were instructed either to suppress or to
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express (i.e. generate actively) thoughts about a white bear whilst relaying their stream of 
consciousness. In the second phase, suppression and expression instructions were 
swapped between the two groups. A comparison of performance in the expression 
condition revealed that those participants who had suppressed in the first stage had 
significantly more thoughts about a white bear than those subjects who expressed in the 
first stage. This phenomenon was duly termed the ‘rebound’ effect of suppression.
Since this investigation, other researchers have observed the paradoxical effect of 
suppression on frequency of neutral thoughts (Lavy & van den Hout, 1990; Clark et al., 
1991). However, it is important to note that studies have yielded mixed results. For 
instance, some researchers have reported that suppression does not influence the 
frequency of the target thought (e.g. Muris et al., 1993), whilst others have noted a 
decrease in frequency (e.g. Roemer & Borkovec, 1994). Some authors have argued that 
this inconsistency may indicate that the effect of suppression is weak and transitory or 
that it could reflect important methodological discrepancies between studies (e.g. 
Abramowitz et al., 2001). Nevertheless, in a recent meta-analysis of controlled studies 
(Abramowitz et al., 2001), it was shown that there was a small to moderate ‘rebound’ 
effect of thought suppression. This ‘rebound’ effect has clear relevance for understanding 
psychological disorders characterised by the persistent recurrence of unwanted thoughts. 
Indeed, a considerable body of research has rapidly emerged which has examined 
suppression of thoughts analogous to those which are characteristic of certain 
psychological disorders. Most of these studies have been conducted in non-clinical 
populations and the work has rarely extended beyond simply measuring the impact of 
suppression on thought frequency (for a review, see Purdon, 1999). Once again, the 
results of these investigations have been inconsistent. Nevertheless, thought suppression 
has now been cited as a factor in the development and/or maintenance of various
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problems. For example, it has been incorporated in conceptualisations of obsessive- 
compulsive disorder (OCD; Salkovskis, 1996), posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; 
Ehlers & Clark, 2000), generalised anxiety disorder (GAD; Wells, 1995), and depression 
(Wenzlaff et al., 1988).
1.2. Wells' metacognitive model o f GAD
Wells argues that styles of thinking and the real or experienced uncontrollability 
and intrusiveness of thoughts will only be understood by recourse to metacognitive levels 
of explanation (Wells, 2005). This view is embraced in his metacognitive model of GAD 
which attempts to explain the difficult-to-control, excessive, distressing, and generalised 
nature of worry that is the central criterion for this diagnosis.
Wells’ cognitive model of GAD (Wells, 1995) distinguishes between two types of 
worry, termed Type 1 and Type 2 worries. Type 1 worries focus upon external daily 
events such as finances, and non-cognitive internal events such as bodily sensations. In 
contrast, Type 2 worries are concerned with the nature and occurrence of thoughts 
themselves; in essence, Type 2 worry is worry about worry. Wells’ model places especial 
importance upon the role of Type 2 worry in the manifestation of GAD. Indeed, Wells 
and Carter (1999, 2001) have provided data which support this view. Wells’ accounts for 
the existence of worry about worry by positing that patients hold negative beliefs about 
worrying itself (e.g. worrying is harmful). These negative beliefs fall into two broad 
domains concerning (1) the uncontrollability of worry, and (2) the dangers of worry for 
mental, physical or social well-being. It is also postulated that once worry about worry is 
established through the activation of these beliefs, a number of additional factors are 
implicated in the escalation and maintenance of the problem: (1) emotional symptoms;
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(2) behavioural responses; (3) thought control attempts. Each of these factors will be 
considered in turn.
First, Type 2 worry is associated with an increase in negative emotions such as 
anxiety and sadness. These symptoms maybe interpreted as evidence supporting Type 2 
concerns. For example, the sensation that one’s mind is racing may be viewed as 
evidence for loss of mental control. Second, a person with GAD might engage in 
behavioural responses aimed at avoiding the dangers of worrying (e.g. reassurance 
seeking). There are three potential problems with these behaviours: (1) some behaviours 
generate conflicting, ambiguous, or incorrect information, thereby creating uncertainty 
which can act as another trigger for worrying; (2) behaviours such as seeking reassurance 
from others removes an opportunity to discover that worrying can be effectively self­
controlled rather than avoided or controlled by others; and (3) the effective cessation of 
worrying prevents the person discovering that worrying is harmless. Third, an individual 
with GAD may engage in direct thought control strategies that are not helpful. In 
particular, the person may try to stop thinking thoughts that might trigger a worry 
sequence. Wells cites studies which have demonstrated that similar suppression attempts 
inadvertently lead to an increase in the occurrence of unwanted thoughts (e.g. Wegner et 
al., 1987; Clark et al, 1991, 1993) and concludes that this phenomenon may play a role in 
GAD. More specifically, ineffectiveness of thought suppression attempts may be 
interpreted as evidence of loss of mental control and could strengthen negative beliefs 
about the uncontrollability of worry. Accordingly, this perpetuates worry about worry.
1.3. Rationale for the current proposal
It is the role of thought suppression attempts in the maintenance of Type 2 worry 
that provides the focus for this proposal. Whilst a few studies have investigated how
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suppression of worry-related thoughts influences the subsequent frequency of these 
thoughts (e.g. Mathews & Milroy, 1994), it is my understanding that no research has been 
conducted into the impact of suppression attempts on the appraisal of worry. Given 
Wells' predictions, it is obvious how the extant literature can be extended. The aims and 
hypotheses for the present proposal are outlined below.
2. Aims and Hypotheses
2.1. Aims
(1) To establish whether attempts to suppress worrisome thoughts paradoxically lead to 
an increase in the frequency of these thoughts in a group of high worriers. Although 
it is acknowledged that this has been investigated in a small number of previous 
studies, results have varied. Moreover, fulfilment of this aim will aid the 
interpretation of the findings relating to the second aim of this study.
(2) To determine whether thought suppression attempts lead to a strengthening of 
concerns about the uncontrollability of worry and its harmful effects. In essence, 
this tests Wells’ prediction that thought control exacerbates worry about worry.
2.2. Hypothesis
Based upon Wells’ cognitive model of GAD, it is hypothesised that worry 
suppression attempts will be associated with a subsequent increase in the frequency of 
these worries and with the exacerbation of concerns about the uncontrollability and 
harmful effects of worry.
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3. Plan of Investigation
3.1. Participants and Recruitment
A cohort of 50 high worriers will be selected from an initial sample recruited via: 
a) University of Glasgow staff and student e-mail; b) advertisement in the local 
community (e.g. university departments, local newspapers); and c) announcements during 
lectures at University of Glasgow. Selection of the 50 participants will be based upon 
their ratings on the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990). This 
measure is described below. Prior research with college samples (Molina & Borkovec, 
1994) has shown that a PSWQ total score of 56 falls 1 standard deviation below the mean 
of individuals diagnosed with GAD by the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule- 
Revised (ADIS-R; DiNardo & Barlow, 1988). Accordingly, participants in the present 
study will be regarded as ‘high worriers’ if their PSWQ total score is greater than or 
equal to 56. This cut-off point has been used in previous research examining the 
characteristics of high worriers (Ruscio, 2002). Based upon previous findings (Ruscio, 
2002), it is anticipated that approximately 200 subjects will have to be recruited into the 
initial sample. Review of previous Major Research Projects indicates that recruitment of 
this sample size is attainable in the allotted time.
3.2. Measures
3.2.1. Pre-experimental measures
Participants will complete three self-report measures. The first is the Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990), a 16-item measure assessing trait 
worry. It was developed primarily out of clinical and research experiences with GAD 
clients and can be viewed as a measure that reflects severe worry. Items are rated on a 5- 
point Likert scale and are summed to form a total score ranging from 16 to 80. The
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PSWQ has excellent psychometric properties in student, community and clinical samples 
(Ruscio & Borkovec, 2004). The second measure is the Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
Questionnaire (GAD-Q-IV; Newman et al., 2002), a self-report diagnostic measure of 
GAD. This measure has good reliability and validity (e.g. Newman et al., 2002) and 
shares a high level of diagnostic agreement (k  = 0.70) with the Anxiety Disorders 
Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; Brown et al., 1994) that is at least as high as 
the diagnostic agreement between two independent administrations of the ADIS-IV GAD 
module ( k  = 0.65; Brown et al., 2001). The GAD-Q-IV is scored following the DSM 
algorithm for GAD, and individuals meeting all of the criteria are diagnosed with the 
disorder. The final measure is the Beck Depression Inventory -  Second Edition (BDI-II; 
Beck et al., 1996). Given the frequent co-occurrence of anxiety and depression in 
emotional disorders, it is felt that the degree of current depressive symptomatology 
should be characterised in the recruited sample. Furthermore, should it transpire that there 
is a significant difference in depressive symptomatology between the two experimental 
groups, it would be possible to partial out the effect of this discrepancy using analysis of 
covariance.
3.2.2. Experimental measures
Participants will be required to complete a number of visual analogue scales 
(VASs) at various points throughout the procedure. A VAS is a measurement instrument 
that attempts to measure a characteristic or attitude that is believed to range across a 
continuum of values and which cannot be directly measured. For this study, a VAS 
comprises a horizontal line, 100mm in length, which is anchored by descriptors at each 
end. The participant will be required to mark a point on the line which they feel
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represents their current state. The VAS score is determined by measuring the distance 
between the left hand end of the line and the subject’s mark.
3.3. Design and Procedures
All participants will provide written informed consent. Participants will be 
pseudo-randomly assigned to one of two groups, Suppression and Mention. Pseudo­
randomisation will ensure that an equal number of participants (N=25) are placed in each 
group and that mean PSWQ scores are similar across the two experimental conditions. 
This process will be conducted by a researcher who is not involved with the study.
The experimental procedure consists of three main phases (Phases 1, 2, and 3), all 
of which last for 5 minutes. Before entering Phase 1, participants will be instructed to 
identify their most distressing current worry. In order to encourage them to comply with 
this instruction and to save them potential embarrassment, they will not be asked to give 
details of this worry to the experimenter. Instead, they will be asked to give a basic 
indication of the context of their worry (e.g. work). They will then be directed to rate 
their identified worry on a number of VASs. These scales will assess the amount of 
distress associated with that particular worry, the controllability of their worry, and the 
impact of the worry upon their general physical, mental and social well-being. Also, 
before commencing the experiment, subjects will be asked to rate their general levels of 
anxiety on a VAS.
Participants will be given the experimental instructions for the thought monitoring 
intervals (Phases 1, 2 & 3). Subjects will record thought occurrences relating to their 
identified worry by clicking on a computer mouse attached to a computer. This ‘event 
marking’ procedure is less intrusive than other means (e.g. stream of consciousness 
vocalisation) and may overcome the problem of participants wishing to appear that they
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are complying with instructions (Purdon, 1999). In Phase 1, all participants will be told 
that they can think about anything, including their worry. At the end of this phase, they 
will complete the same VASs described above. In Phase 2, the Suppression group will be 
told that they can think of anything they like, but that they must try to suppress thoughts 
about their worry. The Mention group will continue as in Phase 1. At the end of Phase 2, 
participants will again complete the VASs previously described. In addition, all subjects 
will rate suppression effort and success on VASs (manipulation check). For Phase 3, the 
instructions given in Phase 1 will apply to all participants. This interval is included to 
establish whether a paradoxical ‘rebound’ effect of suppression can be observed. At the 
end of Phase 3, participants will once again complete the VASs described above. Also, 
they will rate spontaneous suppression effort and success on VASs (manipulation check). 
At the end of the experiment, subjects will be debriefed and thanked for participating. It 
is expected that the entire procedure will last for approximately 40 minutes.
3.4. Settings and Equipment
The experimental procedure will be carried out in a quiet room and distractions 
will be kept to a minimum. The primary piece of equipment will be a portable computer 
and mouse. Questionnaires and rating sheets will also be employed.
3.5. Power Calculation
A series of power calculations was conducted in order to examine how the power 
of this study would fluctuate as a function of number of participants and effect size. 
Computations were carried out using the computer software, G-POWER (Erdfelder et al.,
1996). The calculations focused on the second aim of the study (see Aims and 
Hypotheses) given that this is the primary interest. The hypothesis associated with this
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aim (see Aims and Hypotheses) dictates that data analyses using repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) should reveal significant interaction effects between 
group (Suppression, Mention) and time (each subject will produce ratings at four 
different time points) for concerns about uncontrollability of worry and its harmful 
effects. Therefore, the power calculations examined the power of the study to detect these 
hypothesised interaction effects.
Assumptions were made in calculating power. First, since no published studies 
have examined this area of interest, it was not possible to estimate the effect size by 
referring to previous findings. Accordingly, it was necessary to employ Cohen’s effect 
size (f) conventions for ANOVA (Cohen, 1977, 1988). Values for f  of 0.1, 0.25, and 0.4 
correspond to “small”, “medium”, and “large” effect sizes, respectively. Second, rho, the 
population correlation between the individual levels of the within-subjects factor (time), 
was conservatively predicted to be 0.3. Third, it was assumed that the correlation between 
all possible pairs of the repeated measurements would be identical. This is an assumption 
of repeated measures ANOVA. Fourth, the significance level (a) was taken to be 0.05.
The results from the power calculations are depicted in Figure 1. Based upon the 
assumptions described above, this figure illustrates how the power of the study would 
fluctuate as a function of total number of participants (N) and effect size, f. Inspection of 
the graph indicates that, for “medium” effect sizes and with the proposed sample size of 
50, the study will have adequate power (i.e. more than the standard threshold of 0.80). In 
fact, analysis revealed that the power of the proposed study to detect the hypothesised 
interaction effects between group and time is 0.95 (assuming “medium” effect sizes).
[Figure 1 about here]
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3.6. Data Analysis
All exploratory data analyses and statistical procedures will be conducted using 
the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS; Nie et al., 1970). Howell (1997) 
will be employed as the main statistics resource text. All significance tests will be two- 
tailed and a significance threshold of p=0.05 will be implemented for all effects 
examined. Raw data will be examined in order to determine whether the assumptions of 
parametric analysis are satisfied. As endorsed by Howell (1997), in those cases where 
either or both of the assumptions of homogeneity of variance and normality are not 
fulfilled, appropriate transformations may be performed.
Data meeting the assumptions of parametric analysis will be analysed using t- 
tests, or repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). Where both groups are 
compared on a single measure (e.g. PSWQ scores), unpaired t-tests will be conducted.
For these calculations, the pooled variance estimate will be employed, as advised by 
Howell (1997). In the current investigation, subjects will be measured for the same 
variable on more than one occasion (e.g. anxiety levels). Data of this form will be 
analysed employing repeated measures ANOVA. This procedure is sensitive to violations 
of the assumption of compound symmetry of the covariance matrix. In fact, in cases 
where there is departure from this assumption, the degrees of freedom will be adjusted 
using a value of e calculated by either the Greenhouse-Geisser (1959) or the Huynh-Feldt 
(1976) procedure. As recommended by Howell (1997), when the value of 8 computed by 
the Greenhouse-Geisser procedure is near or above 0.75, the c value derived using the 
Huynh-Feldt procedure will be preferred. If analysis reveals a significant main effect of a 
within-subject factor with more than two levels, multiple comparisons will be carried out 
employing paired t-tests and a Bonferroni correction (Myers, 1979). Indeed, Maxwell 
(1980) showed that this method suitably controlled the familywise error rate. Simple
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effects analyses will be used to investigate significant interactions between subject group 
and a within-subjects factor. Within-subjects simple effects will be evaluated by 
conducting separate repeated measures ANOVA for each group. Between-subjects simple 
effects will be examined by running discrete one-way ANOVAs at each level of the 
within-subjects factor, using the pooled error term from the original analysis that yielded 
the interaction. Further, for these between-subjects analyses, the degrees of freedom will 
be adjusted as advised by Howell (1997).
If it transpires that data are sometimes unsuitable for parametric analysis, 
equivalent non-parametric analyses will be conducted instead. Parametric and non- 
parametric correlations will be calculated using Pearson’s product-moment and 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients, respectively.
4. Practical Applications
Thought suppression has been cited as an important factor in the maintenance of 
worry about worry in GAD (Wells, 1995). The current study has the potential to generate 
data which support this viewpoint. Not only would this be a useful theoretical step, but it 
would provide further endorsement for some of the treatment methods which have been 
derived from this assumption (see Wells, 1995). It is also hoped that the findings from 
this investigation will generate ideas for future research which may lead to further 
improvements in the way in which GAD is treated.
5. Timescale
Procedural aspects of the study (e.g. computer software for monitoring thought 
frequency; design of the VASs) will be formalised over the summer 2005.
Ethical approval to be obtained by September 2005.
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Recruitment to commence in October 2005.
Data collection to be completed by the end of April 2006.
Draft of thesis to be completed by the end of June 2006.
Submit research portfolio at the end of July 2006.
6. Ethical Approval
Ethical approval will be sought from the appropriate ethics committee(s). Most 
aspects of the study (e.g. completing questionnaires) are expected to be well tolerated. 
However, given that participants will be asked to focus upon a specific worry as part of 
the experimental procedure, it is expected that they will experience some mild transitory 
discomfort. Indeed, this possibility will be explicitly stated to potential participants in the 
Information Sheet. It is emphasised that comparable manipulations have been employed 
in a number of previous studies of similar populations (e.g. Mathews & Milroy, 1994; 
Purdon et al., 2005) and that no serious long-term effects have ever been reported. Once 
the procedure is completed, all subjects will be briefed regarding the specific rationale for 
the study.
If, whilst taking part in this study, the researcher determines that a participant may 
require professional attention (e.g. they present with signs of severe depression), their GP 
will be informed. This decision will always be discussed with the participant before the 
GP is informed. Also, the Information Sheet will state that such an eventuality may arise.
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Figure 1. A graph depicting the power of the design of this study to find a significant 
interaction between group and time as a function of the total number of subjects and 
Cohen’s effect size, f.
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ADDENDUM
Whilst piloting the protocol described in this chapter, its ecological validity has 
come under scrutiny. A few participants have remarked that the process seems quite 
contrived and that it does not reflect how they worry in the outside world. Accordingly, a 
significant amendment is proposed. The experiment will be run over the course of one 
week in participants’ everyday environment. At the start and finish of this week, 
participants will meet with the researcher for approximately 30 minutes on each occasion. 
At the first session, participants will be asked to identify and rate a current worry (as 
described in the original proposal). Then, for the following week, they will keep a record 
of how often their worry enters their mind. For this task, they will be given a golf tally 
counter. At the end of each day, they will make a note of the tally counter score in a 
diary. Half of the cohort will be instructed to suppress their chosen worry, and the other 
half will be told to think about anything, including their worry. At the end of the week, 
participants will return for the second session at which they will again rate their worry. It 
is highlighted that a similar approach has been previously employed in published peer- 
reviewed research examining thought suppression (Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994). By 
using this methodology, the study will provide a more ecologically valid assessment of 
the effects of thought suppression within the context of worry.
It is acknowledged that the new procedure will be more demanding of 
participants’ time. Other than that, the ethical considerations are unchanged.
Trinder, H., & Salkovskis, P.M. (1994). Personally relevant intrusions outside the 
laboratory: long-term suppression increases intrusion. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 32, 833-842.
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How do thought suppression attempts impact upon beliefs 
about uncontrollability of worry?
Prepared in accordance with requirements for submission to Behaviour Research and Therapy (see 
Appendix 3.1).
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Abstract
According to Wells’ metacognitive model of Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
(GAD; Wells, 1995, Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 23, 301-320), GAD 
patients attempt to suppress intrusions that trigger worry. Wells postulates that these 
attempts are rarely effective and may, in fact, increase the frequency of worry triggers. 
These apparent failures are interpreted as evidence for loss of mental control, thereby 
exacerbating beliefs about the uncontrollability of worry. The current study tested these 
predictions. Sixty-two high worriers completed a naturalistic experiment comprising two 
sessions separated by an experimental week. In Session 1, participants recorded their 
beliefs about worry in general, including its uncontrollability. They then selected a 
current worry and recorded how often it came to mind over the following week. The 
Suppression group (N=32) suppressed their chosen worry during the week. The Mention 
group (N=30) simply monitored its occurrence. In Session 2, measures completed at 
Session 1 were repeated. Contrary to prediction, the Suppression group reported a 
significant improvement in the controllability of their worrying in general. No shift was 
demonstrated by the Mention group. In addition, relative to the Mention group, the 
Suppression group reported more success at suppressing their chosen worries, spent less 
time thinking about them, and found them to be more controllable and less distressing. 
Findings are discussed within the context of Wells’ model.
Keywords: thought suppression, metacognition, worry, generalised anxiety 
disorder.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Thought suppression
An investigation by Wegner and colleagues (Wegner et al., 1987) has had a 
remarkable impact upon subsequent conceptualisations of psychological disorders. The 
study comprised two 5-minute experimental periods during which participants were 
required to vocalise their stream of consciousness into a tape recorder. For the first 
period, participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, suppression and 
expression. In the suppression condition, participants verbalised their thoughts whilst 
trying not to think about a white bear. In the expression condition, participants were told 
to try to think of a white bear. In the second experimental period, instructions were 
swapped between groups. During both experimental periods, participants rang a bell 
whenever thoughts about a white bear came to mind.
Two important findings emerged from this work. First, participants were not able 
to suppress completely thoughts about white bears. Second, comparison of performance 
under expression instructions revealed that participants who had already suppressed in the 
first period recorded significantly more thoughts about a white bear relative to those who 
expressed in the first period. This phenomenon was termed a ‘rebound effect’ since 
suppression led to a subsequent surge in thoughts. These observations suggested that 
attempted thought suppression can have paradoxical effects as a self-control strategy 
(Wegner et al., 1987). Wegner et al. also postulated that this form of mental control could 
play a role in generating and maintaining obsessions and preoccupations.
The difficulties in interpreting the Wegner et al. (1987) findings are well 
documented. In particular, employment of a crossover design and the use of an 
expression, rather than a mention, control condition have been questioned (Lavy & van 
den Hout, 1990; Clark et al., 1991; Purdon & Clark, 2000). Nevertheless, this seminal
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work provided the impetus for a number of experimental studies of thought suppression. 
These have been reviewed elsewhere (Purdon, 1999, 2004; Purdon & Clark, 2000; Rassin 
et al., 2000; Abramowitz et al., 2001; Smari, 2001). Overall, findings have proved 
inconsistent (Smari, 2001; Purdon, 2004). In studies examining neutral thoughts, some 
researchers have reported rebound effects (e.g. Clark et al., 1991; Clark et al., 1993), 
whereas others have not (e.g. Merckelbach et al., 1991; Muris et al., 1993). In addition, 
some investigators have observed an ‘immediate enhancement effect’ whereby, whilst 
suppressing, individuals experience target thoughts at a higher rate than participants in 
control conditions (e.g. Lavy & van den Hout, 1990). Other studies have not 
demonstrated this effect (e.g. Clark et al., 1991).
Immediate enhancement and rebound effects have clear relevance for 
understanding psychological disorders characterised by the persistent recurrence of 
unwanted thoughts. Accordingly, several studies have examined the suppression of 
clinically relevant, as opposed to neutral (e.g. white bear), cognitions. For example, some 
investigators have explored suppression of worry-related thoughts (Mathews & Milroy, 
1994; Becker et al., 1998), anxious thoughts (e.g. Roemer & Borkovec, 1994; Koster et 
al., 2003), trauma-related thoughts (e.g. Harvey & Bryant, 1998; Shipherd & Beck,
2005), and obsessional thoughts (e.g. McNally & Ricciardi, 1996; Purdon et al., 2005). 
Most of these studies have been conducted on non-clinical analogue populations, and 
have also revealed rather equivocal findings (for a review, see Purdon, 1999). Some 
authors have argued these inconsistencies may reflect methodological discrepancies 
between studies, or that effects are weak or transitory (e.g. Abramowitz et al., 2001). In a 
recent meta-analysis of studies examining neutral and clinically relevant thoughts 
(Abramowitz et al., 2001), a small-to-medium rebound effect of suppression was 
confirmed, although there was no evidence for an immediate enhancement effect.
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In sum, following the work by Wegner et al. (1987), thought suppression effects 
have received considerable research attention. Overall, findings have proved somewhat 
inconsistent. Nevertheless, thought suppression is commonly cited as a factor in the 
development and/or maintenance of emotional disorders. For instance, it is incorporated 
in cognitive conceptualisations of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD; Salkovskis,
1989), posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Ehlers & Clark, 2000), and generalised 
anxiety disorder (GAD; Wells, 1995).
1.2. Wells ’ metacognitive model o f GAD
Metacognition refers to cognitive factors that appraise, control, and monitor 
thinking. Wells argues that styles of thinking and the real or experienced uncontrollability 
and intrusiveness of thoughts will only be understood by recourse to metacognitive levels 
of explanation (Wells, 2005). This view is embraced in his metacognitive model of GAD 
(Wells, 1995) which attempts to explain the difficult-to-control, excessive, distressing, 
and generalised nature of worry that is the central feature of this diagnosis.
Wells’ model of GAD distinguishes between two types of worry, termed Type 1 
and Type 2 worries. Type 1 worry focuses upon external daily events such as finances, 
and non-cognitive internal events such as bodily sensations. In contrast, Type 2 worry is 
concerned with the nature and occurrence of thoughts themselves; in essence, Type 2 
worry is worry about worry. Wells’ model places especial importance upon the role of 
Type 2 worry in the manifestation of GAD.
Upon encountering an intrusive thought, often in the form of a “What if ...?” 
question, Wells argues that a person with GAD activates positive beliefs about the use of 
worry as a coping strategy (e.g. worrying helps me work things out). This instigates a 
Type 1 worry sequence in which various negative outcomes are contemplated and
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possible ways of coping are conceived. It is during this sequence that negative beliefs 
about worry are then triggered. These beliefs fall into two broad domains concerning: (1) 
the uncontrollability of worry; and (2) the dangers of worry for mental, physical or social 
well-being. Once negative worry beliefs become activated during a Type 1 episode, the 
person negatively appraises the occurrence of worry. This is Type 2 worry or worry about 
worry. Wells’ model further postulates that once worry about worry is established, 
additional factors escalate and maintain the problem. One particular factor is the 
employment of thought control attempts. It is the purported role of thought control 
attempts in GAD that provides the focus for the current study.
According to Wells, by having conflicting beliefs about worry, individuals with 
GAD are left in a state of cognitive dissonance. GAD patients attempt to overcome this 
conflict by trying not to think thoughts that might trigger worry. In other words, they try 
to suppress these thoughts. Pointing to findings from the experimental literature (Wegner 
et al., 1987; Clark et al., 1991), Wells argues that this is problematic because thought 
suppression attempts are rarely entirely effective and may, in fact, increase the frequency 
of worry triggers. This ineffectiveness, Wells argues, is then interpreted by GAD patients 
as evidence for loss of mental control, thereby strengthening their beliefs about the 
uncontrollability of worry. Accordingly, worry about worry is perpetuated.
1.3. Rationale for the current study
The present study therefore aimed to investigate the impact of thought 
suppression attempts upon beliefs about worry. Whilst a few studies have investigated 
how suppression of worries influences their frequency (e.g. Mathews & Milroy, 1994; 
Becker et al., 1998), no research has examined the effect of suppression on the appraisal 
of worry itself. Given Wells' prediction that thought suppression attempts strengthen
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beliefs about the uncontrollability of worry, it is clear how the extant literature can be 
extended.
The current study is in keeping with a growing trend within the thought 
suppression literature. Whereas earlier studies predominantly measured thought 
frequencies, more recent work has examined the impact of suppression on more diverse 
phenomena such as emotional experience and cognitive appraisals (e.g. Purdon et al., 
2005). Indeed, it has been suggested that the most important effects of suppression may 
not relate to thought frequency at all (Purdon, 1999).
We were also keen in the present work to maximise ecological validity. The vast 
majority of studies examining thought suppression have been conducted within a 
laboratory setting and over a matter of minutes. In contrast, the present study was 
conducted within the participants’ natural environment and over the course of a week. It 
is argued that this approach is more relevant to clinical experience.
Finally, in piloting this study, we endeavoured to be consistent with Wells’ model 
by asking participants to identify intrusions which triggered their Type 1 worry 
sequences. However, many found it extremely challenging to make the distinction 
between intrusive triggers and the worry sequence itself. Therefore, the protocol was 
amended so that participants were requested: (i) to select a current worry, and if assigned 
to the suppression group, (ii) to try to suppress it as soon as it came to mind.
Accordingly, in a more indirect way, participants still suppressed the initial thought 
relating to their chosen worry (i.e. the intrusion). Another benefit in adopting this 
approach was that it allowed greater consistency in the instructions given to participants.
The primary hypothesis for the present study was that suppression attempts would 
lead to a strengthening of beliefs about the uncontrollability of worry. In keeping with
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Wells’ model, the study also monitored for the impact of suppression on other 
metabeliefs cited as being important in GAD.
2. Method
2.1. Overview
Sixty-two high worriers completed the experiment which comprised two sessions 
separated by an experimental week. At Session 1, participants recorded their beliefs about 
worry in general, including level of uncontrollability. They then selected a current worry, 
and rated it along a number of dimensions, including uncontrollability. Next, they were 
given a tally counter to record how often the chosen worry came to mind over the 
experimental week. Half of the cohort was told to suppress their chosen worry for the 
experimental week. The other half was instructed simply to monitor its occurrence. At the 
end of each day, participants noted their tally counter scores in a diary. At Session 2, 
measures completed at Session 1 were repeated.
2.2. Power calculation
Prior to recruitment, power calculations were conducted to examine how the 
power of the study would fluctuate as a function of number of participants and effect size. 
Computations were carried out using the computer software, G-POWER (Erdfelder et al., 
1996). The calculations focused on the hypothesis that data analysis using repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) would reveal a significant interaction effect 
between group (Suppression, Mention) and session (Session 1, Session 2) for ratings of 
uncontrollability of worry. Assumptions were made in calculating power. First, since no 
published studies have examined this area of interest, it was not possible to estimate the 
effect size by referring to previous findings. Accordingly, Cohen’s effect size (f)
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conventions for ANOVA were employed (Cohen, 1977, 1988). Second, rho, the 
population correlation between the individual levels of the within-subjects factor 
(session), was conservatively predicted to be 0.3. Third, the significance level (a) was 
taken to be 0.05. Calculations revealed that, for a medium effect size and with a sample 
size of 60, the study would have adequate power (i.e. more than the standard threshold of 
0.80).
2.3. Recruitment o f a cohort o f high worriers
The Local Research Ethics Committee approved the study (see Appendix 3.2) and 
all participants gave written informed consent. Undergraduate and postgraduate students 
at the University of Glasgow were approached via an introductory e-mail forwarded by 
the University Computing Services. The researcher (AM) did not therefore have direct 
access to student e-mail addresses. The e-mail asked whether the recipients considered 
themselves to be “worriers” and whether they would be interested in participating in a 
study investigating the ways in which people worry. Attached to the e-mail were an 
information sheet (see Appendix 3.3) and a document for basic personal details (name, 
date of birth, gender, contact telephone number, address and e-mail address). Those 
interested in participating were asked to complete the personal details sheet and return it 
to the researcher by e-mail. Upon receipt, the researcher posted to the potential 
participant a pack containing a stamped addressed envelope, an information sheet, a 
consent form, and a copy of the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al.,
1990). The latter is a 16-item self-report measure which assesses trait worry. Items are 
rated on a 5-point Likert scale and summed to form a total score ranging from 16 to 80. 
The PSWQ has excellent psychometric properties in student, community and clinical 
samples (Ruscio & Borkovec, 2004). If, after rereading the information sheet, the
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students were still interested in participating, they completed the consent form and 
PSWQ, and returned them to the researcher.
In total, 289 students responded to the e-mail, and all received a pack. Of these, 
128 returned the completed forms. The decision regarding which participants were then 
contacted was made based upon PSWQ scores. Prior research with college samples 
(Molina & Borkovec, 1994) has shown that a PSWQ total score of 56 falls 1 standard 
deviation below the mean of individuals diagnosed with GAD by the Anxiety Disorders 
Interview Schedule-Revised (ADIS-R; DiNardo & Barlow, 1988). Accordingly, for the 
present study, participants were defined as high worriers if their PSWQ total score was 
greater than or equal to 56. This cut-off point has been used in previous research 
examining the characteristics of high worriers (Ruscio, 2002). Employing this cut-off, 95 
high worriers were identified. The 33 participants who scored below the cut-off were 
contacted by e-mail, told that they would not be participating, and thanked.
Of the 95 high worriers, 85 were contacted by telephone to explain further the 
nature of the study and give the participants the opportunity to ask questions. It was not 
possible to get in touch with the other 10 individuals. Those receiving any form of 
psychological/psychiatric treatment were excluded at this stage (n=4). Nine decided they 
no longer wished to take part in the study. The remaining 72 high worriers agreed to 
participate in the experiment.
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2.4. Procedure
The basic procedure is depicted in Figure 1. The current study was conducted 
over the period of one week. At the beginning and end of this week, participants met with 
the researcher on a one-to-one basis. Each session (Sessions 1 and 2) lasted 
approximately 30 minutes and both took place in the same room.
[Figure 1 about here]
2.4.1. Session 1
2.4.1.1. Questionnaires
At the start of the session, participants completed the Generalised Anxiety 
Disorder Questionnaire (GAD-Q-IV; Newman et al., 2002) and the Beck Depression 
Inventory - Second Edition (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996). The GAD-Q-IV is a self-report 
diagnostic measure of GAD with good reliability and validity (e.g. Newman et al., 2002). 
Using the recommended cut-off score of 5.7 (Newman et al., 2002), diagnostic agreement 
( k  = 0.67) with the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; Brown 
et al., 1994) is as high as that between two independent ADIS-IV GAD module 
administrations ( k  = 0.65; Brown et al., 2001). The BDI-II is a 21-item self-report 
inventory with well-established psychometric properties (Beck et al., 1996; Whisman et 
al., 2000). Given the frequent co-occurrence of anxiety and depression in emotional 
disorders, it was necessary to characterise the degree of depressive symptomatology in 
the cohort.
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2.4.1.2. Introducing Visual Analogue Scales
After questionnaire completion, participants were given a practice Visual 
Analogue Scale (VAS) for ‘how cloudy it is right now’ (Omm=not at all, 
100mm=extremely). Each VAS during the experiment similarly comprised a horizontal 
line, 100mm in length, anchored by descriptors at each end. For each one, participants 
marked the line to reflect their current view. VAS scores were determined by measuring 
the distance between the left hand end of the line and the participant’s mark.
2.4.1.2. Anxiety levels at the start o f the session
Participants were then presented with a VAS which assessed the following: How 
anxious are you feeling right now? (0mm=not at all, 100mm=extremely).
2.4.1.4. Overall worrying VASs
The participants were then given 6 VASs, each presented on a separate page. 
These assessed the following (descriptors for the 0mm and 100mm anchor points, 
respectively, are given in parentheses): (a) Reflect upon your overall worries. How much 
distress do your worries cause you? (none at all, a great deal); (b) Reflect upon the act of 
worrying. How uncontrollable is your worrying? (not at all, extremely); (c) Reflect upon 
the act of worrying. How bad is your worrying for your health and well-being? (not at all, 
extremely); (d) Reflect upon the act of worrying. How much does your worrying help you 
to deal with problems? (not at all, a great deal); (e) Reflect upon the act of worrying. How 
much does your worrying help you to solve problems? (not at all, a great deal); and (f) 
Reflect upon the act of worrying. How much does your worrying help you to prepare for 
potential difficulties? (not at all, a great deal)
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2.4.1.5. Selection and rating o f a specific worry
Participants were next asked to reflect upon their current worries. They were told 
to select a specific worry that had been particularly troubling them in the last week and 
which would likely to be still bothering them in a week’s time. It was stressed that they 
should give this choice careful thought. In order to encourage compliance and minimise 
potential embarrassment, participants were not required to give details of their worry to 
the researcher. Once identified, participants spent 30 seconds thinking over the worry in 
their mind (worry priming period). After this, participants identified a category within 
which their worry fell. Categories were based upon those elucidated by Roemer et al 
(1997). Two VAS manipulation checks were then completed: “How easy was it for you 
to bring your chosen worry to mind and keep it there?” (0mm=not at all, 
100mm=extremely) and, “How anxious are you feeling right now? (0mm=not at all,
100mm=extremely).
Next, participants completed 5 further VASs, each on a separate page: (a) In the 
last week, how much have you tried to suppress thinking about your chosen worry? (not 
at all, a great deal); (b) In the last week, how successful have you been at suppressing 
your chosen worry? (not at all, extremely); (c) In the last week, how much time have you 
spent thinking about your chosen worry? (none at all, all the time); (d) In the last week, 
how much distress has your chosen worry caused you? (none at all, a great deal); and (e) 
In the last week, how uncontrollable has your chosen worry been? (not at all, extremely)
2.4.1.6. Tally counter and worry monitoring
Participants were then given a golf tally counter and instructed to keep this with 
them at all times for the next week. It was suggested that, during the day, they could keep 
the tally counter in their pocket or in their bag and at night, they should leave it next to
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their bed. To help them remember their counters, a yellow spot, 5mm in diameter, was 
placed on their watch, keys, or mobile phone.
All participants were then instructed in using the tally counter to register chosen 
worry occurrences (see Appendix 3.4). In brief, they were told to click once for each time 
that their thoughts turned to their chosen worry. It was stressed that they should only 
click once whether the worry entered the mind fleetingly or stayed for a longer period. 
They were also assured that it did not matter what made their worry come to mind.
2.4.1.7. Suppression and Mention groups
The high worriers were then randomly assigned to one of two groups, Suppression 
and Mention. Seventy-two envelopes were prepared, half of which had a slip of paper 
with “S” on it, and the other half of which had a piece of paper marked “M”. Participants 
selected an envelope and according to their selection, were given one of two possible 
instructions:
“S” (Suppression group) -  "For the whole o f the next week, I  want you to try as 
hard as you can to suppress your chosen worry; that is, try not to allow your worry to 
enter your head. I f  and when your worry does come to mind, try to push it away 
immediately. However, still be sure to click for the times when your chosen worry does 
enter your head”.
“M” (Mention group) -  “For the whole o f the next week, it does not matter 
whether your chosen worry comes to mind often or not. It might or it might not, it can do 
either. However, be sure to click for the times when your chosen worry does enter your 
head”.
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2.4.1.8. Diary
Participants were then handed a diary for the coming week comprising 8 sheets, 
one for each day of the study. At the end of each day, the tally counter score was 
recorded, and five VASs were completed: (a) How much did you try to suppress your 
chosen worry during the day? (did not try at all, tried my hardest); (b) How successful 
were you at suppressing your chosen worry during the day? (not at all, extremely); (c) 
How much time did you spend thinking about your chosen worry during the day? (no 
time at all, all the time); (d) How much distress did your chosen worry cause you during 
the day? (none at all, a great deal); and (e) How uncontrollable was your chosen worry 
during the day? (not at all, extremely).
Attached to the front of the diary was a Key Points To Remember sheet which 
summarised the main instructions for the week. Before ending the session, participants 
read this sheet to confirm that it corresponded with their understanding of the procedure 
for the week.
2.4.2. Experimental week
At the end of each day, participants filled in the relevant sheet from their diary 
and reset their tally counter to zero.
2.4.3. Session 2
The diary and tally counter were collected from participants. They then completed 
the same VASs introduced in sections 2.4.1.3. and 2.4.1.4. Next, they were asked to think 
about their chosen worry for 30 seconds. At the end of this period, they were 
administered the VASs described in section 2.4.1.5.
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The researcher then asked a series of open-ended questions regarding the 
experimental week. It was checked that the chosen worry continued to be an active 
concern. Participants also estimated the accuracy with which the tally counter scores 
reflected the number of times that their worry had come to mind during the week: 
0%=completely inaccurate; 100%=perfect.
At the end of the session, the study rationale was explained.
2.5. Data Analysis
All exploratory data analyses and statistical procedures were conducted using the 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS; Nie et al., 1970). Howell (1997) was 
employed as the main statistics resource text. All significance tests were two-tailed and a 
significance threshold of p=0.05 was implemented throughout. Raw data were examined 
to determine whether the assumptions of parametric analysis were satisfied. As endorsed 
by Howell (1997), in those cases where either or both of the assumptions of homogeneity 
of variance and normality were not fulfilled, transformations were performed if possible.
Data meeting assumptions for parametric analysis were analysed using t-tests, or 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). Where both groups were compared on 
a single measure, unpaired t-tests were conducted. For these calculations, the pooled 
variance estimate was employed (cf. Howell, 1997). When participants were measured 
for the same variable on more than one occasion (e.g. worry uncontrollability ratings), 
data were analysed using repeated measures ANOVA, a procedure which is sensitive to 
violations of the assumption of compound symmetry of the covariance matrix. In cases 
where there was a departure from this assumption, Greenhouse-Geisser (1959) or Huynh- 
Feldt (1976) correction procedures were employed.
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Simple effects analyses were used to investigate significant interactions between 
group and a within-subjects factor. Within-subjects simple effects were evaluated by 
conducting separate repeated measures ANOVA for each group. Between-subjects simple 
effects were examined by running discrete one-way ANOVAs at each level of the within- 
subjects factor, using the pooled error term from the original analysis that yielded the 
interaction. Further, for these between-subjects analyses, the degrees of freedom were 
adjusted (cf. Howell, 1997).
Where data were unsuitable for parametric analysis, Mann-Whitney U tests were 
employed to compare two groups on a single measure. Categorical data were analysed 
using Pearson’s Chi-square (%2) test.
Demographic and clinical data (e.g. age and BDI-II scores) are described using 
the mean with the standard deviation (SD) of the mean as the index of variability. 
Experimental data are presented using the mean with the standard error of the mean 
(SEM).
3. Results
3.1. Overview
Results are divided into five main sections. The first (3.2) covers the basic 
demographic and clinical data gathered from participants. The second (3.3) reports the 
data obtained in Sessions 1 and 2 relating to participants’ views regarding worry in 
general. The third (3.4) presents the findings collected in Sessions 1 and 2 which were 
specific to the chosen worries. The fourth (3.5) documents the analyses of the data from 
participants’ diaries. The last section (3.6) offers a summary of the main findings.
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3.2. Participant characteristics
From the original cohort of 72 high worriers, 62 participants successfully 
completed the study. Six failed to attend for the first session and 4 withdrew from the 
study between Sessions 1 and 2 (3 from the Mention group, 1 from the Suppression 
group).
The characteristics of the 62 high worriers who completed the study are presented 
in Table 1. The two groups did not differ significantly on age [z=-0.09, p>0.9], gender 
ratio [x 2( 1 ) = 0 .1 5 ,  p>0.6], PSWQ [z=-0.35, p>0.7], GAD-Q-IV [z=-0.64, p>0.5], or BDI- 
II [z=-0.37, p>0.7]. Analysis did not reveal a significant association between group and 
GAD diagnosis, as determined using the GAD-Q-IV [x2(l)=1.35, p>0.2].
[Table 1 about here]
3.3. Appraisals o f overall worrying
VAS data and repeated measures ANOVA results are presented in Table 2.
[Table 2 about here]
Given the main hypothesis of the study, the key analysis concerned beliefs about 
the uncontrollability of worry in general. A significant interaction effect between group 
and session was found [F(l,60)=5.9, p<0.05]. This is depicted in Figure 2. Investigation 
of simple effects established that in contrast to the Mention group [F<1], the Suppression 
group rated their worry as significantly more controllable in Session 2 compared with 
Session 1 [F(l,31)=6.0, p<0.05]. At both Sessions 1 and 2, ratings of uncontrollability did
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not differentiate the two groups [Session 1: F<1; Session 2: F(l,90)=3.6, non-significant; 
F o.o5( 1 , 9 0 ) * 4 . 0 ] .
Table 2 confirms that no other analyses revealed significant effects.
[Figure 2 about here]
3.4. Chosen worries
3.4.1. Manipulation checks
3.4.1.1. Ease with which chosen worry was brought to mind and kept there
For all participants across both sessions, the mean (SEM) rating was 79.0 (1.9) 
where 0mm=not at all and 100mm=extremely. Therefore, the cohort was able to hold 
their chosen worry in mind during the 30-second priming period. Repeated measures 
ANOVA revealed no significant effects [all Fs<1.9].
3.4.1.2. Anxiety levels after priming chosen worry
VAS anxiety scores after arrival and the worry priming period were examined 
using a three-way repeated measure ANOVA with one between-subjects factor (group) 
and two within-subjects factors (session, time-point (after arrival, after worry priming 
period)). As expected, a significant main effect of time-point was revealed [F(l,60)=80.1, 
p<0.001]. All participants were significantly more anxious after worry priming 
[mean(SEM)=52.5 (2.3)] compared with shortly after arrival [mean(SEM)=33.6 (2.1)]. 
The main effects of session [F(l,60)=2.7, p>0.1] and group [F(l,60)=2.5, p>0.1] did not 
approach significance, nor were there any significant higher order interactions [all 
Fs<1.6].
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3.4.2. Categories fo r  chosen worry
Table 3 shows the frequencies at which particular worry categories were selected. 
Twenty-four participants chose two or more categories to describe their chosen worry. 
Accordingly, the total frequency is greater than 62.
[Table 3 about here]
3.4.3. Suppression effort manipulation check
These data are presented in Table 4 and depicted in Figure 3. Analysis revealed 
significant main effects of group [F(l,60)=38.9, p<0.001] and session [F(l,60)=7.4, 
p<0.01], and importantly, a significant group by session interaction [F(l,60)=31.8, 
p<0.001]. Simple effects calculations found that the Mention group made significantly 
less effort to suppress their chosen worry in the experimental week compared with the 
week leading up to Session 1 [F(l,29)=33.8, p<0.001]. In contrast, the Suppression group 
made significantly more effort to suppress in the experimental week compared with the 
week before Session 1 [F(l,31)=4.4, p<0.05]. Furthermore, in line with expectation, 
suppression effort ratings differentiated the two groups at Session 2 [F(l,l 19)=70, 
significant; Fo.os(l,119) « 4.0], but not at Session 1 [F<1].
[Table 4 about here]
[Figure 3 about here]
3.4.4. Subjective success in suppressing the chosen worry
The results for this measure are shown in Table 4 and Figure 4. Two-way repeated 
measures ANOVA demonstrated significant main effects for both group [F(l,59)=6.8,
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p<0.05] and session [F(l,59)=8.7, p<0.01]. There was also a significant interaction 
between group and session [F(l,59)=23.1, p<0.001]. Simple effects analyses revealed 
that the Suppression group rated their suppression success as significantly higher in the 
experimental week compared with the week leading up to Session 1 [F(l,31)=35.2, 
p<0.001]. There was no such effect for the Mention group [F(l,28)=1.5, p>0.2]. 
Furthermore, relative to the Mention group, the Suppression group had significantly more 
suppression success in the experimental week [F(l,l 12)=25, significant; Fo.o5( l , l  12) « 
4.0], but not in the week before Session 1 [F<1],
[Figure 4 about here]
3.4.5. Remaining VASs
These data are provided in Table 4 along with the corresponding analyses. In 
brief, for the experimental week compared with the week before Session 1, all 
participants thought significantly less about their chosen worry [F(l,60)=47.4, p<0.001], 
were caused significantly less distress by their chosen worry [F(l,60)=24.0, p<0.001], 
and reported that it seemed significantly more controllable [F(l,60)=15.4, p<0.001].
No other significant effects were revealed.
3.5. Diary data
Sessions 1 and 2 fell on days 1 and 8, respectively. Given that the data gathered 
on these days did not cover full 24-hour periods, they are omitted from the analyses.
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3.5.1. Tally counter scores
The mean (SEM) estimated accuracy of the tally counter scores was 79.8%
(1.5%), where 0%=completely inaccurate and 100%=perfect. Accuracy estimates did not 
differentiate the two groups [U=454, z=-0.38, p>0.7; Mention group mean (SEM)=80.4% 
(2.1%); Suppression group mean=79.3% (2.1%)].
[Figure 5 about here]
[Table 5 about here]
Tally counter score data are presented in Table 5 and Figure 5. Analysis using 
repeated measures ANOVA with group and day as factors found a significant main effect 
of day [F(5,300)=4.4, p<0.01]. A paired t-test demonstrated tally counter scores were 
significantly higher on Day 2 compared with Day 7 [t(61)=2.1, p<0.05; Day 2 mean 
(SEM)=15.3 (1.7); Day 7 mean (SEM)=12.5 (1.2)]. From the omnibus ANOVA, the main 
effect of group was non-significant [F(1,60)=T.6, p>0.2], but the group by day interaction 
approached significance [F(5,300)=2.2, p=0.057]. Given the potential importance of this 
finding, simple effects analyses were conducted. This revealed that, whilst tally counter 
scores for the Mention group remained stable during the week [F<1], those for the 
Suppression group significantly changed [F(5,155)=4.6, p<0.01]. Inspection of Figure 5 
indicates that scores for the Suppression group decreased over the course of the week. In 
fact, scores for this group were significantly higher on Day 2 compared with Day 7 
[t(31)=2.8, p<0.01]. Yet, on both Days 2 and 7, tally counter scores did not differentiate 
the groups [Day 2: F<1; Day 7: F(l,99)=3.4, non-significant; Fo.os(l,99) « 4.0].
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3.5.2. VAS ratings
Analyses for all five of the VASs used in the diary revealed no significant main 
effects of day, nor any significant interaction effects between group and day. The ratings 
on these measures were therefore collapsed across the day factor and are presented in 
Table 6, along with the results from the original two-way repeated measures ANOVA. 
Inspection of this table shows a significant main effect of group for all five VASs 
employed. As a manipulation check, analysis confirmed that the Suppression group tried 
to suppress their chosen worry significantly more than the Mention group throughout the 
week [F(l,59)=49.0, <0.001]. Moreover, relative to the Mention group, the Suppression 
group recorded more success at suppressing their chosen worry [F(l,57)=43.8, p<0.001], 
spent less time thinking about it [F(l,60)=6.0, <0.05], experienced less distress on 
account of it [F(l,60)=5.1, <0.05], and found it to be more controllable [F(l,60)=4.2, 
p<0.05].
[Table 6 about here]
3.6. Summary o f main findings
This study recruited two groups of high worriers matched for age, gender ratio, 
and symptomatology.
In session 1, both groups selected personal worries which stimulated comparable 
levels of anxiety, and which, in the previous week, had caused them equivalent 
levels of distress, had occupied their thinking to the same extent, and had been 
similarly uncontrollable.
135
Chapter 4 Major Research Project
Manipulation checks confirmed that, relative to the Mention group, the 
Suppression group tried significantly harder to suppress their chosen worries 
during the experimental week.
For the Suppression group, there was a significant decline in the number of times 
the chosen worries came to mind as the week progressed. In contrast, worry 
occurrences remained stable in the Mention group.
- The Suppression group reported significantly more success at suppressing their 
chosen worries, spent relatively less time thinking about their chosen worries, 
experienced less distress on account of them, and found them to be more 
controllable. Compared with the week before the study, both groups spent less 
time thinking about their chosen worries, experienced less distress on account of 
them, and found them to be more controllable.
- After the experimental week, the Suppression group reported a significant 
improvement in the controllability of their overall worrying. No such effect was 
found for the Mention group. There were no significant shifts in the other positive 
and negative beliefs measured.
4. Discussion
The primary aim of this study was to test experimentally a prediction from Wells’ 
(1995) metacognitive model of GAD. Working on the basis that individuals with GAD 
try not to think thoughts that trigger worry, Wells argues that such suppression attempts 
are rarely entirely effective and may, in fact, increase the frequency of worry triggers (cf. 
Wegner et al, 1987). This ineffectiveness is, in turn, interpreted as evidence for loss of 
mental control and consequently, beliefs about the uncontrollability of worry are 
strengthened (Wells, 1995, 2005).
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The results from the study are quite striking. Contrary to prediction, high worriers, 
instructed to suppress a specific worry for a week, recorded a subsequent improvement in 
the controllability of their worrying in general. No such shift was demonstrated by high 
worriers in a control (mention) condition. These effects did not emerge in isolation. On 
two different measures of subjective suppression success, the Suppression group was 
significantly more successful at suppressing chosen worries relative to controls.
Moreover, during the week (diary data), the Suppression group spent significantly less 
time thinking about their chosen worries, found them to be more controllable, and 
experienced less distress on account of them. Finally, whilst worry occurrences remained 
stable in the Mention group, the Suppression group experienced a significant decline in 
worry frequency as the week progressed. It should be noted that the last two effects 
emerged after further analysis of an interaction effect which only approached significance 
(p=0.057).
The cohesion in these findings lends support to the view that genuine effects have 
been uncovered. In turn, this raises the obvious question of how they can be reconciled 
with Wells’ model of GAD. In fact, in some respects, the findings are supportive of the 
model and its implications for treatment. In the present study, attempts to suppress 
amongst high worriers proved relatively successful, in turn promoting a beneficial 
adjustment in beliefs about uncontrollability of worry. The latter effect (resultant belief 
change) is entirely in keeping with the Wells model. When working with GAD patients, 
Wells advocates employment of verbal reattribution techniques and behavioural 
experiments to achieve metacognitive change (Wells, 1997, 2005). These procedures are 
geared towards enabling the patient to experience, and/or become aware of, some control 
over worry. Through these means, changes in uncontrollability metabeliefs are realised. 
The present study has confirmed that: 1) experience of some control at one level (chosen
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worry) leads to a significant and advantageous shift at the metacognitive level; and 2) a 
simple week-long manipulation, akin to a behavioural experiment, effects metacognitive 
change. Indeed, perhaps the most important finding in the current study is the 
demonstration that a simple procedure is safe and beneficial to individuals suffering with 
levels of worry equivalent to those seen in GAD patients.
Where Wells’ model has difficulty relates to what actually happens when worriers 
try to suppress intrusions that trigger worry. The model asserts that suppression attempts 
are rarely entirely effective. In other words, a person may even experience some relative 
success at suppressing, but the thoughts will inevitably recur to some extent. This is then 
taken as evidence for loss of mental control, thereby maintaining beliefs about worry 
uncontrollability. In the present study, the Suppression group was, indeed, not completely 
efficient in suppressing their chosen worries. Nevertheless, relative to the Mention group, 
the Suppression group appraised their suppression efforts in a positive light. Perhaps 
then, there is a more delicate balance than Wells implies, in how a worrier interprets the 
outcome of suppression attempts.
There are many factors which could play a role in the appraisal of thought 
recurrences during suppression. For example, as discussed by other authors (e.g. Purdon, 
1999), some individuals may invest highly in being able to control thoughts. Accordingly, 
even if they achieve some suppression success, thought recurrences will still be 
experienced as aversive. Similarly, participants low in mood may be particularly sensitive 
to failures in thought control. Conversely, on account of holding tacit positive beliefs 
about worry (e.g. worrying helps me cope; Borkovec & Roemer, 1995; Davey et al.,
1996; Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997), individuals may, from time to time, be quite 
receptive of recurrent worry triggers. In turn, suppression success may be viewed more 
positively. All told, interpretation of suppression success, and its consequences for beliefs
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about worry uncontrollability, are likely to be dynamic processes, influenced by many 
factors. Accordingly, based on the present data, the position held within the Wells model 
may require some reworking. Future research could examine further how worriers 
appraise suppression attempts. In particular, one could explore the intermediary roles of 
beliefs about importance of thought control and meanings attached to thought 
recurrences.
Given the inconsistencies in the thought suppression literature (Purdon, 1999; 
Abramowitz et al., 2001), it is perhaps not surprising that the current investigation did not 
observe equivalent phenomena to the immediate enhancement and rebound effects seen 
in laboratory-based studies (e.g. Wegner et al., 1987; Lavy & van den Hout, 1990; Clark 
et al., 1991, 1993). In fact, a review of thought suppression in psychopathology (Purdon,
1999) found that, of the few studies that have investigated the suppression of worry- 
related thoughts, none demonstrated paradoxical effects on thought occurrence. More 
recent experimental work supports this view (Behar et al., 2005). Still, the question 
remains regarding the apparent ability of high worriers here, to suppress to some degree. 
In fact, it is not unprecedented for an experimental study to find suppression to be 
relatively effective. For instance, two studies examining suppression of OCD-type 
intrusions (Rassin, 2001; Purdon et al., 2005) generated evidence that suppression offers 
some control. Looking beyond thought suppression research, Borkovec and colleagues 
(1983) found that individuals instructed to postpone their worries until a specified worry 
period experienced fewer worrisome thoughts than participants in a control condition.
Wells (1997, 2005) also advocates employment of worry periods, although with a 
different rationale. In essence, the aim of the exercise is to disconfirm beliefs about worry 
uncontrollability. Upon noticing a worry trigger, GAD patients are asked to 
postpone/suspend the worry process until a specified period. Later, this period should
139
Chapter 4 Major Research Project
only be used if necessary. Wells (2005) emphasises a distinction between suppression and 
postponement/suspension. So, the GAD patient should not suppress worry-related 
thoughts, but simply decide not to engage a worry sequence in response to them. Thus, 
the initial thought may remain in consciousness, but the patient does not engage with it. 
Wells (1997) has documented that when this procedure is applied, patients typically 
report success in worry postponement, and often do not use the worry period. This should 
lead to a corresponding shift in beliefs about worry uncontrollability.
Wells’ account introduces the possibility that the high worriers in the present 
study were not suppressing, but were instead postponing their worries in some way. 
However, given the explicit nature of the suppression instructions and the results from the 
manipulation checks, this seems a little implausible. Alternatively, it might be argued that 
suppression and postponement interventions are both effective strategies in dealing with 
worry triggers. A number of questions are now raised in relation to the suppression vs. 
postponement distinction. One, in clinical reality, even if clinicians understand this 
distinction, what do patients make of it? Two, assuming patients do grasp the distinction, 
how well do they implement it? Three, is it possible that patients fluctuate between using 
both strategies? These questions could be the focus of interesting future research. 
Moreover, it would be most informative to carry out a study in which both suppression 
and postponement conditions are employed.
At debriefing, many participants in the Suppression group (19/32) spontaneously 
mentioned that they tried to distract themselves (with different thoughts or activities) 
when they noticed a worry-related thought come to mind. In light of the overall findings, 
this raises the possibility that this strategy led to some suppression success. In fact, in a 
recent study of thought control strategies in GAD (Coles & Heimberg, 2005), it was 
argued that there is growing evidence that distraction may be an adaptive method of
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thought control. A clear limitation of the present study is that no rigorous attempt was 
made to assess the psychological mechanisms by which thought suppression was 
attempted. This is a common drawback in the thought suppression literature. The 
instruction to suppress a thought is likely to trigger a range of different processes in 
different circumstances and people (Smari, 2001). The Thought Control Questionnaire 
(TCQ, Wells & Davies, 1994) cites five main strategies used to control unpleasant and 
unwanted thoughts: distraction, social control, worry (about something else), punishment, 
and reappraisal. Future research should examine whether particular control strategies are 
associated with greater suppression success of worry triggers and improvements in beliefs 
about worry uncontrollability.
Three additional findings of note were observed. The first relates to participants’ 
ratings of their chosen worries in Sessions 1 and 2. For these ratings, participants based 
their answers on the previous week. For the experiment week (Session 2 ratings) 
compared with the pre-experiment week (Session 1 ratings), all participants, irrespective 
o f condition, spent less time thinking about their chosen worries, experienced less distress 
on account of them, and found them to be more controllable (see Table 4). One 
interpretation of these findings is that the self-monitoring process common to both groups 
was beneficial in some way. Indeed, a number of participants commented that the study 
had made them aware that they did not worry as much as they had thought. This may 
have important therapeutic implications and should be investigated further. An alternative 
explanation is that during the week, habituation of the chosen worry occurred. However, 
this is less likely given that priming of the chosen worry aroused equivalent levels of 
anxiety in both sessions.
It is highlighted that there are discrepancies between findings described 
immediately above, and those revealed by diary data. As already discussed, analyses of
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diary data did reveal significant effects of suppression for time spent, distress, and 
controllability scores in relation to chosen worries. One plausible explanation for these 
discrepancies is that, relative to retrospective ratings, an in vivo diary is a more sensitive 
measure. Alternatively, the marked changes in retrospective scores between Sessions 1 
and 2, irrespective of experimental condition, may have obscured effects of suppression.
A second interesting finding was that the Mention group tried significantly less to 
suppress their chosen worries in the experimental week compared with the pre- 
experimental week (see Figure 3). Again, this may reflect the influence of self- 
monitoring during the experiment. Thus, at Session 1, perhaps both groups gave inflated 
ratings of effort to suppress chosen worries in the previous week. By Session 2, following 
a week of paying close attention to worrying style, the Mention group may have gained a 
better appreciation of how much they normally suppress. Values for suppression effort in 
the Mention group are interesting in themselves. Both diary (mean=26.3) and Session 2 
(mean=25.3) scores (Omm=not at all, 100mm=a great deal) indicate that suppression 
effort was not especially high. This suggests that thought suppression is not commonly 
attempted by high worriers, and may limit the significance of its role in the maintenance 
of worry about worry. Indeed, other researchers have concluded that GAD patients may 
not try to suppress or control worry more than non-anxious controls (Purdon, 1999, 
Craske & Hazlett-Stevens, 2002).
The final results of interest relate to other beliefs about worry. In keeping with 
Wells’ model, we looked at participants’ beliefs about the detrimental impact of worry on 
health and well-being. For all participants, ratings for this belief stayed constant during 
the study. Viewed as a behavioural experiment, the study was not geared towards 
generating experiential evidence that worrying is not dangerous. Moreover, for the 
Suppression group at least, one of the potential drawbacks of suppression success is that
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it precludes discontinuation of beliefs about the danger of worry. Accordingly, it is 
perhaps not surprising that this belief did not shift. It was also shown that there were no 
significant changes in positive beliefs about worry. Again, given the focus of the 
experimental intervention, this was perhaps to be expected.
Whilst the external validity of the study was enhanced by its completion over a 
week, within the everyday environment of participants, there were methodological 
limitations. First, some participants commented that they found the tally counter and 
yellow sticker intrusive at times, especially in the early part of the week. These may 
therefore have acted as triggers for chosen worries and may have unduly disrupted the 
naturalistic nature of the study. Future studies might consider not collecting on-the-spot 
frequency data; e.g. at the end of each day, participants could estimate total number of 
target thoughts that day. Indeed, when, as here, research is more focused on the appraisal 
of thought control, immediate thought frequency data may be less critical.
A second limitation relates to the lack of a baseline period. As it stands, it is not 
guaranteed that the two groups were matched on pre-experimental chosen worry 
frequency. Accordingly, it is not possible to be certain about the impact of suppression on 
this measure. The experimental week could have been divided into two blocks, the first to 
collect baseline data, the second to conduct the suppression and mention manipulations.
In fact, at the outset, this design was considered. However, it was decided that it would be 
impractical, both for researcher and participants.
Third, an analogue sample was recruited. Arguably, this creates some doubt about 
the external validity of the findings. However, mean score on the PSWQ [mean(SD) = 
65.9(5.8)] was similar to that seen in individuals diagnosed with GAD using a structured 
clinical interview (Molina & Borkovec, 1994; mean(SD) = 67.7(8.9)) or the GAD-Q-IV 
(Ruscio, 2002; mean(SD) = 67.2(9.5)). Therefore, participants were experiencing worry
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severity at a level typical of that seen in clinical samples. Furthermore, GAD-Q-IV data 
revealed that two-thirds of the sample satisfied DSM-IV criteria for GAD.
Finally, over half of the worries selected were related to work/studies (see Table 
3). Again, this probably reflects the fact that a student sample was recruited. 
Understandably, questions may arise regarding the extent to which the current findings 
apply to clinical samples, in which worries are likely to be more wide-ranging. In fact, in 
a recent meta-analysis (Abramowitz et al., 2001), most thought suppression studies, 
including those using disorder-relevant target thoughts, recruited healthy or unscreened 
undergraduate volunteers. Even though the present study is an improvement upon the 
usual approach, it will be important to examine whether the present findings can be 
replicated with a cohort of GAD patients seeking treatment. This could have exciting 
implications for interventions with GAD, especially those focused at the metacognitive 
level.
In summary, contrary to expectation, high worriers, asked to suppress a chosen 
worry for a week, reported a significant increase in worry controllability. High worriers 
who only monitored a chosen worry did not show this change. These effects challenge the 
assumption within Wells’ model of GAD that thought suppression leads to the 
exacerbation of beliefs about worry uncontrollability. Perhaps a key lesson from these 
data relates to the dangers of clinical dogma. Although the original empirical 
investigation of thought suppression was conducted only twenty years ago, it has already 
been incorporated as a maintaining/exacerbating factor in many recent conceptualisations 
of psychological problems. Yet, the current findings, along with those of other 
investigations (for a review, see Purdon, 1999), show that the effects of thought 
suppression are far from clear-cut. Thus, although further research is required, the present
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findings indicate that due caution should be exercised when citing thought suppression in
generic formulations of psychopathology, in particular GAD.
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Table 1. Characteristics of the Suppression and Mention groups. Data are means with 
SDs in parentheses._______________________________________________________
Mention Suppression
N 30 32
Age (years) 21.7(3.0) 22.9 (6.1)
Female:Male 28:2 29:3
PSWQ score 65.7 (5.6) 66.1 (6.0)
GAD-Q-IV score 8.1 (3.0) 7.5 (3.2)
GAD diagnosis 22 19
BDI-II score 14.3 (7.6) 16.1 (11.3)
ABBREVIATIONS: N = Number in group; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; GAD-Q-IV= 
Generalised Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire; GAD diagnosis = Number of participants who satisfied 
criteria for a diagnosis o f Generalised Anxiety Disorder, as determined using the GAD-Q-IV; BDI-II = 
Beck Depression Inventory - Second Edition.
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Table 3. The frequencies at which participants chose particular worry categories to 
represent their chosen worry_____________________________________________
Worry Category Number of participants
Illness/Health/Inj ury 7
The future 22
Family/Home 7
Relationships/Friendships 7
Success/Failure 15
Finances 5
Work/Studies 36
Psychological/Emotional concerns 2
Minor/Routine concerns 0
Other 0
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Chapter 4 Major Research Project
Table 5. Mean (SEM) tally counter scores, as a function of group and day.
Group Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7
Mention
Suppression
13.8(1.7) 14.3(2.0) 13.3(1.6) 14.0(1.9) 12.9(2.0) 14.3(1.8)
16.8(2.9) 13.5(2.5) 12.8(2.9) 12.7(2.5) 10.8(2.4) 10.7(1.6)
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Table 6. Mean (SEM) Visual Analogue Scale ratings from the diary, as a function of 
group (Mention, Suppression). The findings from the original two-way repeated measures
ANOVA, for which grou 3 and day were factors, are also presented.
Visual Analogue Scale 
(Omm and 100mm 
descriptors)
Mention Suppression
Effects (F, p)
Group Day Gr° upx Day
How much did you try to 
suppress your chosen 
worry during the day? (did 
not try at all, tried my 
hardest)*
26.3 (3.3)
—
61.3 (3.3) 49.0,<0.001
1.6,
>0.15 F<1
How successful were you 
at suppressing your chosen 
worry during the day? (not 
at all, extremely)**
31.0 (3.4) 61.7 (2.8) 43.8,p<0.001 F<1 F<1
How much time did you 
spend thinking about your 
chosen worry during the 
day? (no time at all, all the 
time)
44.2 (2.5) 35.3 (3.1) 6.0,<0.05 F<1, F<1
How much distress did 
your chosen worry cause 
you during the day? (none 
at all, a great deal)
43.3 (2.7) 35.2 (3.1) 5.1,<0.05 F<1 F<1
How uncontrollable was 
your chosen worry during 
the day? (not at all, 
extremely)
39.9 (2.2) 33.2 (2.9) 4.2,p<0.05
1.0,
>0.35
1.1,
>0.35
* One participant from the Suppression group was removed from the analysis on account o f having an 
incomplete data set. ** 3 participants (2 from Mention, 1 from Suppression) were removed from this 
analysis due to incomplete data sets.
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Figure 1. A basic outline of the procedure employed in the study.
SESSION 1
- Complete GAD-Q-IV and BDI-II.
- Rate current anxiety on VAS.
- Complete overall worry appraisals on 6 VASs (distress caused, uncontrollability, 
bad for health and well-being, help deal with problems, help solve problems, help 
prepare for potential difficulties).
- Select current worry -  worry priming period (30 secs). Then 2 VAS manipulation 
checks (current anxiety, ease with which chosen worry was brought to mind and 
kept there). Five more VASs relating to chosen worry in the last week (tried to 
suppress, success at suppressing, time spent thinking about it, distress caused, 
uncontrollability).
- Given tally counter and worry monitoring instructions.
- Random assignment to Suppression and Mention groups. Given corresponding 
instructions.
EXPERIMENTAL WEEK
- Fill in diary at end of each day: tally counter score and 5 VASs relating to chosen 
worry during day (try to suppress, success at suppressing, time spent thinking about 
it, distress caused by it, uncontrollability).
SESSION 2
- Return diary.
- Rate current anxiety on VAS.
- Complete overall worry appraisals on 6 VASs (distress caused, uncontrollability, 
bad for health and well-being, help deal with problems, help solve problems, help 
prepare for potential difficulties).
- Worry priming period (30 secs). Then 2 VAS manipulation checks (current 
anxiety, ease with which chosen worry was brought to mind and kept there). Five 
more VASs relating to chosen worry in the last week (tried to suppress, success at 
suppressing, time spent thinking about it, distress caused, uncontrollability).
- Debriefed.
ABBREVIATIONS: GAD-Q-IV=Generalised Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire; BDI-II= Beck Depression 
Inventory - Second Edition; VAS=Visual Analogue Scale.
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Figure 2. Mean Visual Analogue Scale ratings for uncontrollability of overall worry by 
the Mention and Suppression groups, as a function of session (Session 1, Session 2). The 
anchor point descriptors on the original VAS were not at all (Omm) and extremely 
(100mm). Bars represent 1 SEM.
■  S ession  1 
□  S ession  2
Mention group Suppression group
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Figure 3. Mean participant ratings for how much they tried to suppress their chosen 
worry in the last week, as a function of session (Session 1, Session 2). The anchor point 
descriptors from the original VAS were not at all (Omm) and a great deal (100mm). Bars 
represent 1 SEM.
70 -
I ■  Session 1 
□  Session 2
Mention group Suppression group
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Figure 4. Mean participant ratings for how successful they were at suppressing their 
current worry in the last week, as a function of session (Session 1, Session 2). The anchor 
point descriptors from the original VAS were not at all (Omm) and extremely (100mm). 
Bars represent 1 SEM.
70 n
Mention group Suppression group
■  Session  1 
□  Session  2
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Figure 5. Mean tally counter scores over the course of the experimental week. Bars 
represent ±1SEM.
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Chapter 5
Single Case Experiment
Simplified habit reversal: an examination of its effectiveness with a 35- 
year old man with chronic eyelash pulling
Prepared in accordance with requirements for submission to Journal o f  Behavior Therapy and 
Experimental Psychiatry (see Part Two, Appendix 1).
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Chapter 5 Single Case Experiment
Abstract
This paper reports upon the use of a simplified habit reversal approach with a 35- 
year old man, D, who presented with a life-long habit of playing with, and pulling on, his 
eyelashes. The intervention took place over 70 days and was conducted using an AB1B2 
single case experimental design. Self-monitoring (A) was followed by awareness 
enhancement (Bi), and then competing response training (B2). Both Bi and B2 
incorporated social support. D became significantly more aware of his habit and there 
was an 85% reduction in habit frequency between awareness enhancement and competing 
response training. Feedback at three-months follow-up indicated that improvements had 
been maintained. Overall, this study supports the employment of habit reversal 
techniques with long-term, problematic habits.
Keywords: habits, hair pulling, behaviour therapy, habit reversal, case study
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Appendix 1.1 - Notes for contributors to Health Bulletin
Papers, articles and other contributions should be sent to the Editor, Health Bulletin, 
Scottish Executive Health Department, Room IE05, St Andrew's House, Edinburgh EH1 
3DE. They must be submitted exclusively for Health Bulletin. Acceptance is on the 
understanding that editorial revision may be necessary. All papers are reviewed by the 
Editor and by peer review, referees being drawn from a panel of appropriate 
professionals. No correspondence can be entered into in relation to articles found to be 
unsuitable and returned to authors.
Potential contributions can be submitted in two ways. Material submitted for publication 
must be typewritten on one side of the paper only, in double spacing and with adequate 
margins, and each page should be numbered. The top typed copy should be submitted, 
with four other copies. We are willing to receive one copy typewritten in the above 
format and accompanied by a disk (Microsoft Word version 98, Excel for tables and 
figures). All papers should be prefaced by a structured Abstract, of about 250 words in 
length. It should normally contain six clearly headed sections entitled Objective, Design, 
Setting, Subjects, Results and Conclusion. The name, appointment and place of work of 
the authors should be supplied on a separate title page. This same page should include the 
full postal address of one author, to whom correspondence and reprints will be directed. 
There should be adequate references to any relevant previous work on the subject; these 
references should appear at the end of the material on a separate page or pages, using the 
Vancouver style, which in the case of papers in journals includes:
Surname and initials of author(s)
Title of paper 
Full name of journal 
Year published 
Volume number
Opening and closing page numbers
Reference to books should similarly include author's name and initials, full title, edition 
(if necessary), place of publication, publisher's name, year and, if required, volume 
number, chapter number or page number.
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SUBMISSION REQUIREMENTS: Authors should submit their articles electronically via the Elsevier 
Editorial System (EES) page of this journal ( h ttp :/ / e e s .elsevier.com/cpr). The system automatically 
converts source files to a single Adobe Acrobat PDF version of the article, which is used in the peer- 
review process. Please note th a t  even though manuscript source files are converted to PDF at 
submission for the  review process, these  source files are needed for further processing after 
acceptance. All correspondence, including notification of the  Editor's decision and requests for 
revision, takes place by e-mail and via the Author's homepage, removing the need for a hard-copy 
paper trail. Questions about the  appropriateness of a manuscript should be directed (prior to 
submission) to the  Editorial Office, details a t  URL above. Papers should not exceed 50 pages 
(including references).
Submission of an article implies tha t  the work described has not been published previously (except 
in the form of an abstract or as  part of a published lecture or academic thesis), tha t  it is not under 
consideration for publication elsewhere, tha t its publication is approved by all authors and tacitly or 
explicitly by the responsible authorities where the work was carried out, and that, if accepted, it will 
not be published elsewhere in the  sam e form, in English or in any other language, without the 
written consent of the Publisher.
FORMAT: We accept most wordprocessing formats, but Word, WordPerfect or LaTeX are preferred. 
Always keep a backup copy of the  electronic file for reference and safety. Save your files using the 
default extension of the program used.
Please provide the following data on the title page (in the order given).
Title. Concise and informative. Titles are often used in information-retrieval systems. Avoid 
abbreviations and formulae where possible.
Author names and affiliations. Where the family name may be ambiguous (e.g., a double name), 
please indicate this clearly. Present the authors' affiliation addresses (where the  actual work was 
done) below the names. Indicate all affiliations with a lower-case superscript letter immediately 
after the author's name and in front of the appropriate address. Provide the full postal address of 
each affiliation, including the country name, and, if available, the  e-mail address of each author.
Corresponding author. Clearly indicate who is willing to handle correspondence a t  all s tages of 
refereeing and publication, also post-publication. Ensure that te leph on e and fax num bers (with  
country and area code) are provided in addition to th e e-m ail address and th e com plete  
postal address.
Present/permanent address. If an author has moved since the work described in the article was 
done, or was visiting at the time, a 'Present address' (or 'Permanent address ') may be indicated as 
a footnote to tha t author's name. The address at which the author actually did the work must be 
retained as the main, affiliation address. Superscript Arabic numerals are used for such footnotes.
Abstract. A concise and factual abstract is required (not exceeding 200 words). This should be typed 
on a separate  page following the  title page. The abstract should s ta te  briefly the  purpose of the 
research, the principal results and major conclusions. An abstract is often presented separate  from 
the article, so it m ust be able to stand alone. References should therefore be avoided, but if 
essential, they must be cited in full, without reference to the reference list.
STYLE AND REFERENCES: Manuscripts should be carefully prepared using the  Publication Manual 
of the American Psychological Association, 5th ed., 1994, for style. The reference section m ust be 
double spaced, and all works cited must be listed. Please note tha t  journal nam es are not to be 
abbreviated.
Reference Style for Journals: Cook, J. M., Orvaschel, H., Simco, E., Hersen, M., and Joiner, Jr., T. E. 
(2004). A te s t  of the tripartite model of depression and anxiety in older adult psychiatric 
outpatients, Psychology and Aging, 19, 444-45.
For Books: Hersen, M. (Ed.). (2005). Comprehensive handbook of behavioral assessm ent (2 
Volumes). New York: Academic Press (Elsevier Scientific).
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TABLES AND FIGURES: Present these, in order, a t  the end of the article. High-resolution graphics 
files must always be provided separa te  from the main text file (see http://ees.e lsevier.com /cpr for 
full instructions, including other supplementary files such as high-resolution images, movies, 
animation sequences, background datasets , sound clips and more).
PAGE PROOFS AND OFFPRINTS: When your manuscript is received by the Publisher it is 
considered to be in its final form. Proofs are not to be regarded as 'drafts '. One se t of page proofs 
will be sen t to the  corresponding author, to be checked for typesetting/editing. No changes in, or 
additions to, the accepted (and subsequently edited) manuscript will be allowed a t this stage. 
Proofreading is solely the  authors ' responsibility.
The Publisher reserves the  right to proceed with publication if corrections are not communicated. 
Please return corrections within 3 days of receipt of the  proofs. Should there  be no corrections, 
please confirm this.
COPYRIGHT: Upon acceptance of an article, authors will be asked to transfer copyright (for more 
information on copyright, see h ttp://authors.elsevier.com). This transfer will ensure the widest 
possible dissemination of information. A letter will be sent to the corresponding author confirming 
receipt of the  manuscript. A form facilitating transfer of copyright will be provided.
If excerpts from other copyrighted works are included, the author(s) must obtain written permission 
from the  copyright owners and credit the source(s) in the article. Elsevier has forms for use by 
authors in these  cases available a t  www.elsevier.com/locate/Dermissions phone: (+44) 1865 
843830, fax: (+44) 1865 853333, e-mail: Dermissions@elsevier.com
NIH voluntary posting policy US National Institutes of Health (NIH) voluntary posting (" Public 
Access") policy Elsevier facilitates author response to the NIH voluntary posting request (referred to 
as the NIH "Public Access Policy", see  http://www.nih.Qov/about/publicaccess/index.htm) by posting 
the peer-reviewed author's  manuscript directly to PubMed Central on request from the author, 12 
months after formal publication. Upon notification from Elsevier of acceptance, we will ask you to 
confirm via e-mail (by e-mailing us at NIHauthorreauest@elsevier.com) th a t  your work has received 
NIH funding and th a t  you intend to respond to the NIH policy request, along with your NIH award 
number to facilitate processing. Upon such confirmation, Elsevier will submit to PubMed Central on 
your behalf a version of your manuscript tha t  will include peer-review comments, for posting 12 
months after formal publication. This will ensure that you will have responded fully to the  NIH 
request policy. There will be no need for you to post your manuscript directly with PubMed Central, 
and any such posting is prohibited.
166
Appendices
Appendix 2.2 - Methodological quality checklist
1) How was the hypothesis/aim/objective of the study described?
Well 2
Adequately 1
Poorly 0
External Validity
2) Were participants diagnosed with OCD?
Yes 2
No, but participants rated highly on OCD inventories (e.g. MOCI) 1
No 0
3) Was the study conducted in a naturalistic or lab-based setting?
Naturalistic 2
Lab-based 0
4) Were participants offered money or course credits for taking part?
No 1
Yes 0
Internal Validity
Selection of samples 
OCD patients:
5) Were accepted diagnostic criteria employed (e.g. DSM)?
Yes 1
No/Not reported 0
All participants, irrespective o f OCD status:
6) Were clear inclusion and exclusion criteria employed?
Yes 1
No/Not reported 0
7) Was OCD symptomatology assessed using a recognised measure (e.g. MOCI) and 
were the findings reported?
Yes 1
No 0
8) Were co-morbid psychological disorders/symptoms measured using reliable and valid 
tools (e.g. SCID, BDI, BAI)?
Yes (minimum of anxiety and depression) 1
No 0
Design
9) Was a parallel groups or crossover design employed?
Parallel groups 1
Crossover 0
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Measurement of thought frequency
10) Was a baseline measure of thought frequency taken?
Yes 1
No 0
11) Did the thought counting method employed seem reasonable?
Yes 1
No 0
12) Other than thought counts, was at least one other measure of thought recurrence 
used?
Yes (e.g. Visual Analogue Scale) 1
No 0
Target thought
13) What method was used to select a target thought?
Participant’s own thought: using an appropriate validated questionnaire (e.g. ROII, III)
2
Participant’s own thought: using instructions or a questionnaire (e.g. ITQ) which 
probably ensured that the thought was obsessive/ego-dystonic 1
Thought-Action Fusion (TAF) thought was provided by researcher 1
Not stated 0
Experimental conditions
14) Was at least one group of participants never given suppression instructions?
Yes 1
No 0
15) The control condition was:
Mention type 1
Non-suppression type 1
Expression type (as used by Wegner and colleagues (1987) 0
16) Was assignment of participants to condition randomised?
Yes and adequately (e.g. computer generated random numbers) 2
Yes, but not adequately (e.g. use of birth dates), or not stated how it was done 1
No 0
Unable to determine 0
17) If there were two groups or more, were they matched with respect to age and gender? 
Yes 1
No 0
Unable to determine 0
Manipulation check
18) Was a suppression effort manipulation check conducted?
Yes 1
No 0
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Data analyses
19) Were appropriate statistical procedures employed to look at the impact of suppression
on thought frequency?
Yes 1
No 0
Power
20) Was a power calculation conducted?
Yes 1
No 0
Unable to determine 0
Maximum possible score = 25
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Appendix 3.1 - Notes for contributors to Behaviour Research and Therapy
Subm ission to  th e journal prior to acceptance Authors can submit their articles electronically 
via the  Elsevier Editorial System (EES) page of this journal h t tp : / /ees .e lsev ier .com /bra t. The system 
automatically converts source files to a single Adobe Acrobat PDF version of the  article, which is 
used in the peer-review process. Please note tha t  even though manuscript source files are 
converted to PDF at submission for the review process, these source files are needed for further 
processing after acceptance. All correspondence, including notification of the  Editor's decision and 
requests for revision, takes place by e-mail and via the Author's homepage, removing the need for a 
hard-copy paper trail.
Online subm ission  is strongly preferred but authors can, in special cases, also submit via mail. 
Four copies of the manuscript, including one se t  of high-quality original illustrations, suitable for 
direct reproduction, should be submitted to Professor G. T. W ilson, Psychological Clinic at 
Gordon Road, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 41C Gordon Road, Piscataway, 
New Jersey, 0 8 8 5 4 -8 0 6 7 , USA. Email: brat@rci.rutaers.edu. (Copies of the  illustrations are 
acceptable for the other sets  of manuscripts, as long as the quality permits refereeing.)
Submission of an article implies tha t  the  work described has not been published previously (except 
in the  form of an abstract or as part of a published lecture or academic thesis), tha t  it is not under 
consideration for publication elsewhere, tha t its publication is approved by all authors and tacitly or 
explicitly by the  responsible authorities where the  work was carried out, and that, if accepted, it will 
not be published elsewhere in the sam e form, in English or in any other language, without the 
written consent of the  Publisher.
Presentation o f m anuscript Please write your text in good English (American or British usage is 
accepted, but not a mixture of these). Italics are not to be used for expressions of Latin origin, for 
example, in vivo, et al., per se. Use decimal points (not commas); use a space for thousands (10 
000 and above). Print the entire manuscript on one side of the paper only, using double spacing and 
wide (3 cm) margins. (Avoid full justification, i.e., do not use a constant right-hand margin.) Ensure 
that each new paragraph is clearly indicated. Present tables and figure legends on separate  pages at 
the end of the manuscript. If possible, consult a recent issue of the journal to become familiar with 
layout and conventions. Number all pages consecutively.
Provide the following data on the title page (in the order given).
Title. Concise and informative. Titles are often used in information-retrieval systems. Avoid 
abbreviations and formulae where possible.
Author names and affiliations. Where the family name may be ambiguous (e.g., a double name), 
please indicate this clearly. Present the authors' affiliation addresses (where the actual work was 
done) below the names. Indicate all affiliations with a lower-case superscript letter immediately 
after the author's  name and in front of the appropriate address. Provide the  full postal address of 
each affiliation, including the  country name, and, if available, the e-mail address of each author.
Corresponding author. Clearly indicate who is willing to handle correspondence a t  all stages of 
refereeing and publication, also post-publication. Ensure that te leph on e and fax numbers (with  
country and area cod e) are provided in addition to  the e-m ail address and th e com plete  
postal address.
Present/permanent address. If an author has moved since the work described in the article was 
done, or was visiting a t  the  time, a 'Present address' (or 'Permanent address ') may be indicated as 
a footnote to tha t author's  name. The address at which the author actually did the work must be 
retained as the main, affiliation address. Superscript Arabic numerals are used for such footnotes.
Abstract. A concise and factual abstract is required (maximum length 200 words). The abstract 
should s ta te  briefly the purpose of the research, the principal results and major conclusions. An 
abstract is often presented separa te  from the article, so it must be able to stand alone. References 
should therefore be avoided, but if essential, they must be cited in full, without reference to the 
reference list.
Keywords. Immediately after the abstract, provide a maximum of 6 keywords, to be chosen from 
the APA list of index descriptors. These keywords will be used for indexing purposes.
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Abbreviations. Define abbreviations th a t  are not standard in this field a t  their first occurrence in the 
article: in the abstract but also in the  main text after it. Ensure consistency of abbreviations 
throughout the article.
N.B. Acknowledgements. Collate acknowledgements in a separa te  section a t  the  end of the article 
and do not, therefore, include them  on the title page, as a footnote to the title or otherwise.
Shorter Comm unications This option is designed to allow publication of research reports tha t are 
not suitable for publication as regular articles. Shorter Communications are appropriate for articles 
with a specialized focus or of particular didactic value. Manuscripts should be between 3000 - 5000 
words, and must not exceed the  upper word limit. This limit includes the  abstract, text, and 
references, but not the  title pages, tables and figures.
Arrangement o f th e article Subdivision of the article. Divide your article into clearly defined and 
numbered sections. Subsections should be numbered 1.1 (then 1.1.1, 1.1.2), 1.2, etc. (the abstract 
is not included in section numbering). Use this numbering also for internal cross-referencing: do not 
just  refer to 'the text. ' Any subsection may be given a brief heading. Each heading should appear on 
its own separa te  line.
Appendices. If there  is more than one appendix, they should be identified as A, B, etc. Formulae 
and equations in appendices should be given separate  numbering: (Eq. A .l) ,  (Eq. A.2), etc.; in a 
subsequent appendix, (Eq. B .l)  and so forth.
Acknowledgements. Place acknowledgements, including information on grants received, before the 
references, in a separa te  section, and not as a footnote on the  title page.
Figure legends, tables, figures, schemes. Present these, in this order, a t  the  end of the article. They 
are described in more detail below. High-resolution graphics files m ust always be provided separate 
from the main text file (see Preparation of illustrations).
Specific remarks Tables. Number tables consecutively in accordance with their appearance in the 
text. Place footnotes to tables below the table body and indicate them with superscript lowercase 
letters. Avoid vertical rules. Be sparing in the use of tables and ensure th a t  the data presented in 
tables do not duplicate results described elsewhere in the article.
Preparation o f supplementary data. Elsevier now accepts electronic supplementary material to 
support and enhance your scientific research. Supplementary files offer the  author additional 
possibilities to publish supporting applications, movies, animation sequences, high-resolution 
images, background datasets , sound clips and more. Supplementary files supplied will be published 
online alongside the electronic version of your article in Elsevier web products, including 
ScienceDirect: http://www.sciencedirect.com. In order to ensure th a t  your submitted material is 
directly usable, please ensure th a t  data is provided in one of our recommended file formats. Authors 
should submit the  material in electronic format together with the article and supply a concise and 
descriptive caption for each file. For more detailed instructions please visit our Author Gateway at 
h ttp ://authors.e lsevier.com . Files can be stored on diskette, ZIP-disk or CD (either MS-DOS or 
Macintosh).
References Responsibility for the  accuracy of bibliographic citations lies entirely with the authors
Citations in the text: Please ensure  tha t  every reference cited in the text is also present in the 
reference list (and vice versa). Any references cited in the abstract m ust be given in full.
Unpublished results and personal communications should not be in the reference list, but may be 
mentioned in the  text. Citation of a reference as 'in press' implies th a t  the  item has been accepted 
for publication.
Citing and listing o f web references. As a minimum, the full URL should be given. Any further 
information, if known (author nam es, dates, reference to a source publication, etc.), should also be 
given. Web references can be listed separately (e.g., after the  reference list) under a different 
heading if desired, or can be included in the reference list.
Text: Citations in the text should follow the referencing style used by the  American Psychological 
Association. You are referred to the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association, 
Fifth Edition, ISBN 1-55798-790-4, copies of which may be ordered from
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http ://www.apa.ora/books/4200061.htm l or APA Order Dept., P.O.B. 2710, Hyattsville, MD 20784, 
USA or APA, 3 Henrietta Street, London, WC3E 8LU, UK. Details concerning this referencing style 
can also be found a t  http://humanities.bvu.edu/linquistics/Henrichsen/APA/APA01.html.
List: References should be arranged first alphabetically and then further sorted chronologically if 
necessary. More than one reference from the sam e author(s) in the sam e year must be identified by 
the letters "a", "b", "c", etc., placed after the year of publication.
Examples: Reference to a journal publication: Van der Geer, J., Hanraads, J. A. J., & Lupton R. A. 
(2000). The art of writing a scientific article. Journal of Scientific Communications, 163, 51-59.
Reference to a book: Strunk, W., Jr., 8i White, E. B. (1979). The elements of style. (3rd ed.). New 
York: Macmillan, (Chapter 4).
Reference to a chapter in an edited book: Mettam, G. R., & Adams, L. B. (1994). How to prepare an
electronic version of your article. In B. S. Jones, & R. Z. Smith (Eds.), Introduction to the electronic
age (pp. 281-304). New York: E-Publishing Inc.
Note tha t  journal nam es are not to be abbreviated.
Preparation of illustrations
Submitting your artwork in an electronic format helps us to produce your work to the best possible 
standards, ensuring accuracy, clarity and a high level of detail.
General points
• Always supply high-quality printouts of your artwork, in case conversion of the electronic 
artwork is problematic.
• Make sure you use uniform lettering and sizing of your original artwork.
• Save text in illustrations as "graphics" or enclose the font.
• Only use the following fonts in your illustrations: Arial, Courier, Helvetica, Times, Symbol.
• Number the  illustrations according to their sequence in the text.
• Use a logical naming convention for your artwork files, and supply a separa te  listing of the
files and the software used.
• Provide all illustrations as separate  files and as hardcopy printouts on separa te  sheets.
• Provide captions to illustrations separately.
•  Produce images near to the desired size of the  printed version.
A detailed guide on electronic artwork is available on our website:
h t to : / /au tho rs .elsevier.com/artwork You are urged to visit this site; some excerpts from the 
detailed information are given here.
Formats Regardless of the application used, when your electronic artwork is finalised, please "save 
as" or convert the  images to one of the following formats (Note the resolution requirements for line 
drawings, halftones, and line/halftone combinations given below.):
EPS: Vector drawings. Embed the font or save the text as "graphics".
TIFF: Colour or greyscale photographs (halftones): always use a minimum of 300 dpi.
TIFF: Bitmapped line drawings: use a minimum of 1000 dpi.
TIFF: Combinations bitmapped line/half-tone (colour or greyscale): a minimum of 500 dpi is 
required.
DOC, XLS or PPT: If your electronic artwork is created in any o f th ese  Microsoft Office 
applications p lease supply "as is".
Line drawings Supply high-quality printouts on white paper produced with black ink. The lettering 
and symbols, as well as other details, should have proportionate dimensions, so as not to become 
illegible or unclear after possible reduction; in general, the figures should be designed for a 
reduction factor of two to three. The degree of reduction will be determined by the Publisher. 
Illustrations will not be enlarged. Consider the page format of the journal when designing the 
illustrations. Photocopies are not suitable for reproduction. Do not use any type of shading on 
computer-generated illustrations.
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Photographs (h a lfton es) Please supply original photographs for reproduction, printed on glossy 
paper, very sharp and with good contrast. Remove non-essential areas  of a photograph. Do not 
mount photographs unless they form part of a composite figure. Where necessary, insert a scale bar 
in the illustration (not below it), as opposed to giving a magnification factor in the legend. Note that 
photocopies of photographs are not acceptable.
Copyright Upon acceptance of an article, authors will be asked to transfer copyright (for more 
information on copyright see  h ttp://authors.elsevier.com). This transfer will ensure the  widest 
possible dissemination of information. A letter will be sent to the corresponding author confirming 
receipt of the manuscript. A form facilitating transfer of copyright will be provided. If excerpts from 
other copyrighted works are included, the author(s) must obtain written permission from the 
copyright owners and credit the source(s) in the article. Elsevier has forms for use by authors in 
these cases available a t  httD://www.elsevier.com/locate/Dermissions phone: (+44) 1865 843830, 
fax: (+44) 1865 853333, e-mail: permissions@elsevier.com
Proofs When your manuscript is received by the Publisher it is considered to be in its final form. 
Proofs are not to be regarded as 'drafts'. One se t of page proofs will be sen t  to the corresponding 
author, to be checked for typesetting/editing. No changes in, or additions to, the  accepted (and 
subsequently edited) manuscript will be allowed a t  this stage. Proofreading is solely your 
responsibility. The Publisher reserves the right to proceed with publication if corrections are not 
communicated. Return corrections within 3 days of receipt of the proofs. Should there be no 
corrections, please confirm this.
Offprints Twenty-five offprints will be supplied free of charge. Additional offprints and copies of the 
issue can be ordered a t  a specially reduced rate using the order form sen t to the corresponding 
author after the manuscript has been accepted. Orders for reprints (produced after publication of an 
article) will incur a 50% surcharge.
NIH voluntary posting policy
US National Institutes of Health (NIH) voluntary posting (" Public Access") policy 
Elsevier facilitates author response to the NIH voluntary posting request (referred to as the NIH 
"Public Access Policy", see  http://www.nih.aov/about/publicaccess/index.htnrU by posting the peer- 
reviewed author's  manuscript directly to PubMed Central on request from the  author, 12 months 
after formal publication. Upon notification from Elsevier of acceptance, we will ask you to confirm 
via e-mail (by e-mailing us a t  NIHauthorrequest@elsevier.com') tha t  your work has received NIH 
funding and tha t  you intend to respond to the NIH policy request, along with your NIH award 
number to facilitate processing. Upon such confirmation, Elsevier will submit to PubMed Central on 
your behalf a version of your manuscript tha t will include peer-review comments, for posting 12 
months after formal publication. This will ensure tha t you will have responded fully to the NIH 
request policy. There will be no need for you to post your manuscript directly with PubMed Central, 
and any such posting is prohibited.
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Appendix 3.2 - Ethical approval letters
Primary Care Division NHS
G artnavd  R o \a :  H ospital 
1055 G reat W estern Road 
G lasgow  G l2  OXH 
Tel: 0141 2 1 J 5600 
w w w .n h s B g .o rg .u k
Greater
Glasgow
Dr Andrew McLean Date 26 August 2005
Trainee Clinical Psychologist Your Ref
University of Glasgow Our Ref
Section of Psychological Medicine
Division of Community Based S ciences Direct line 0141 211 3824
Gartnavel Royal Hospital, Fax 0141 211 3814
1055 G reat W estern Road E-mail anne.m cm ahoniSiaartnavel.
G12 0XH glacom en.scot.nhs.uk
Dear Dr McLean
Full title of study: An investigation into the effects of thought suppression
in a group of high worriers.
REC reference number: 05/S0701/85
Thank you for your letter of 09 August 2005, responding to the Com m ittee’s request for 
further information on the above research  and submitting revised docum entation.
The further information w as considered at the meeting of the Sub-Com m ittee of the REC 
held on 25 August 2005. A list of the m em bers who w ere present at the m eeting is attached.
Confirmation of ethical opinion
On behalf of the Committee, I am pleased  to confirm a favourable ethical opinion for the 
above research  on the basis described in the application form, protocol and supporting 
docum entation a s  revised.
The favourable opinion applies to the research  sites listed on the attached form.
Conditions of approval
The favourable opinion is given provided that you comply with the conditions se t out in the 
attached docum ent. You are  advised to study the conditions carefully.
Approved documents
f The final list of docum ents reviewed and approved by the Committee is as follows:
Document Version Date
Application T1 Ju n e  2005
Investigator CV 27 Ju n e  2005
Investigator CV Supervisor 27 Ju n e  2005
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Protocol 27 Ju n e  2005
Covering Letter 27 Ju n e  2005
Covering Letter two 09 A ugust 2005
Sum m ary/Synopsis 27 June  2005
Copy of Questionnaire 27 Jun e  2005
Participant Information S heet 27 Ju n e  2005
Participant Information S heet two 09 August 2005
Participant C onsent Form 27 Ju n e  2005
R esp o n se  to R equest for Further Information 09 August 2005
O ther Introductory
e-mail
09 August 2005
Management approval
The study should not com m ence at any NHS site until the local Principal Investigator h as 
obtained final m anagem ent approval from the R&D Departm ent for the relevant NHS care 
organisation.
Membership of the Committee
The m em bers of the Ethics Com m ittee who w ere p resen t at the m eeting are  listed on the 
attached sheet.
Notification of other bodies
The Committee Administrator will notify the research  sponsor that the study has a favourable 
ethical opinion.
Statement of compliance
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the G overnance A rrangem ents for 
R esearch  Ethics Com m ittees (July 2001) and complies fully with the S tandard  Operating 
P rocedures for R esearch  Ethics Com m ittees in the UK.
| 05/S0701/85 Please quote this number on all correspondence
With the Com m ittee's best w ishes for the su c cess  of this project 
Yours sincerely
A W McMahon
Research Ethics Co-ordinator (Manager) on behalf of Dr Paul Fleming, Chair
Email: A nne.M cM ahon@ gartnavel.giacom en.scot.nhs.uk
Enclosures:
A ttendance at Sub-C om m ittee of the REC meeting on 25 August 2005 
Standard  approval conditions 
Site approval form (SF1)
P r im a ry  C a re  Division
G annavel Royal Hospital 
1055 G reat W estern Road 
Glasgow G12 0XJ1 
Tel: 0141 211 3600 
wwtv.nhsgg.org.uk
NHS
Greater
Glasgow
Dr Andrew McLean Date 18 January  2006
Trainee Clinical Psychologist Your Ref
University of Glasgow Our Ref
Section of Psychological Medicine
Division of Community B ased Sciences Direct line 0141 211 3824
Gartnavel Royal Hospital, Fax 0141 211 3814
1055 G reat W estern Road E-mail anne.mcmahon(®.aartnavel.
G12 0XH glacom en.scot.nhs.uk
D ear Dr McLean
Full title of study: An investigation into the effects of thought suppression
in a group of high worriers.
REC reference number: 05/S0701/85
Thank you for the am endm ent dated  20 D ecem ber 2005 regarding the above nam ed 
subm ission in which you indicate the  extension of the time period and alteration to the 
setting.
The m em bers of the  Committee present gave a favourable ethical opinion of the am endm ent 
on the basis described in the notice of am endm ent form and supporting docum entation.
Membership of the Committee
The m em bers of the Ethics Committee who w ere present at the meeting are  listed on the 
a ttached  sheet.
Research governance approval
AH investigators and research  collaborators in the NHS should notify the R&D D epartm ent for 
the relevant NHS care  organisation of this am endm ent and check w hether it affects research  
governance approval of the research .
Statement of compliance
The Com m ittee is constituted in accordance with the G overnance A rrangem ents for 
R esearch  Ethics Com m ittees (July 2001) and complies fully with the S tandard  Operating 
Procedures for R esearch  Ethics Com m ittees in the UK.
, [REC reference number]: 05/S07Q1/85_______ Please quote this number on all correspondence ;
Yours sincerely
',v—‘
A W  McMahon
Research Ethics Co-ordinator (Manager) on behalf of Dr Paul Fleming. Chair
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Appendix 3.3 - Participant Information Sheet
Participant Information Sheet
How do people’s attempts to suppress worrisome thoughts 
affect their concerns about worry?
Project Title: An investigation into the effects of thought suppression in a group of high 
worriers.
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before deciding whether you wish 
to participate, it is important to read the following information so that you understand 
why the research is being carried out and what your participation would involve. Please 
take time to read the information carefully and consider whether you wish to take part.
What is the research about?
This research is about worry. Worry is a very common human experience. This study is 
focused upon gaining a better understanding of what happens when people try to stop 
themselves from worrying. It is hoped that the findings from this research will improve 
our understanding of how people view the worrying process.
Why have I been asked to take part?
This is an analogue study. In other words, to improve our understanding of how worry 
affects patients, this study will investigate the experiences of worry in a non-clinical 
population. This may lead to ideas both for future research and for improvements in 
clinical practice with people who seek help from mental health services because of their 
worries.
Do I have to take part?
Taking part in this study is entirely voluntary. If you do decide to take part, you will be 
asked to keep this information sheet and to sign and return a consent form. Also, even if 
you decide to take part, you are still free to withdraw from the study at any time, without 
providing an explanation. Any information collected from you would then be destroyed.
What will happen to me if I take part?
There are two stages in the study. For stage 1, you will be asked to fill in and return a 
questionnaire about your style of worrying. This questionnaire takes no more than 5 
minutes to complete. You may then be contacted by telephone and asked some questions 
about your past and current mental and physical health in order to establish whether you 
meet certain criteria for taking part in stage 2. Participation in stage 2 will involve two 
short sessions with the researcher at times of your convenience and at a location within 
the university. Each of these sessions will last approximately 30 minutes and there will be 
a period of one week between them. At the first session, you will be requested to identify 
one of your current worries and to rate it for certain attributes. Then, for the following 
week, you will be asked to record how often you think about your identified worry and to 
fill in a dairy at the end of each day. In the second session, you will again be asked to rate 
your worry for a number of attributes.
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What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?
There are no known risks associated with taking part in a study of this sort. The 
methodology used in this study has been used by other researchers. However, if you do 
find any aspects of the study distressing, you should let the investigator know. It is 
stressed that your participation is voluntary.
What are the possible benefits of taking part?
There are no direct benefits for you. However, it is hoped that this research will generate 
ideas for future research and lead to improvements in the treatment of worry in clinical 
populations.
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?
Yes. All information will be kept strictly confidential. However, your GP will be 
informed if the researcher becomes concerned about your physical or mental well-being 
(e.g. if it seemed that you may be suffering from severe depression). Every attempt would 
be made to discuss this course of action with you before contacting your GP.
What will happen to the results of the research study?
Participants will be provided with a summary of the findings from the study. It is hoped 
that the study will be published in a scientific journal. Also, the study will be submitted 
for examination as part of the requirements for the Doctorate in Clinical Psychology at 
the University of Glasgow. Your identification will not be included in any publication.
Who is organising and funding the research?
Department of Psychological Medicine, University of Glasgow.
Who has reviewed the study?
The study has been reviewed and approved by the Department of Psychological 
Medicine, University of Glasgow, and the Greater Glasgow Primary Care Division - 
Community and Mental Health Research Ethics Committee.
Contact for further information
If you wish to discuss any points covered in the information sheet or wish to ask any 
questions about specific aspects of the study, please do not hesitate to contact Andrew 
McLean at the address or telephone number given below:
Andrew McLean
Trainee Clinical Psychologist
Department of Psychological Medicine
Gartnavel Royal Hospital
Glasgow, G12 OXH
Tel: 0141 211 0607
email: glasgowworrystudy@yahoo. co. uk
Thank you very much for reading this information sheet. Please keep this copy for 
reference.
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Appendix 3.4 - Verbal instructions for monitoring chosen worry
"Over the next week, I  would like you to make a special effort to be aware o f what you 
are thinking because I  am interested in finding out i f  and when particular thoughts enter 
your head. Specifically, I  would like you to record every time your chosen worry enters 
your head. When you spot that your worry has come to mind, I  want you to click once on 
the tally counter. This task may feel a little strange at first, but people soon get used to it. 
I ’m now going to cover a few  issues which are sometimes raised. The first is that some 
people wonder, “am I  clicking too much? ” or “am I  clicking too little? ” It really doesn’t 
matter -  all I  ask is that you try to be as accurate as you can throughout the week. The 
second issue is whether it matters what triggers you to think about your worry. Again, 
this doesn’t matter - fo r  instance, someone could ask you about it, you could be 
daydreaming, you could hear something on the news that’s related to your worry, you 
could see the yellow spot on your watch, keys, or mobile phone, or you could think about 
this study. The third issue is to do with the accessibility o f the tally counter. I  understand 
that there are times when you are not going to be able to get to your tally counter. Please 
just try to keep count in your head and click the counter the appropriate number o f times 
when you can. Finally, and most importantly, some people ask about whether it matters 
how long the worry stays in your mind. The answer is no, this doesn’t matter. Just click 
fo r each occasion that your chosen worry comes to mind. So, whether your worry enters 
your mind fleetingly or stays fo r  10 minutes, this is just one click. Equally, i f  you worry 
fo r  a while, then get distracted by something for a bit, and then after that, worry again, 
this would count as two clicks. So, in other words, each time your thoughts return to your 
chosen worry, click the tally counter”.
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